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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

ABSTRACT
DELUSIONAL DISORDER: TREATMENT AND THE RESTORATION OF
ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE
by
Martin Kassen
Advisor: Thomas Kucharski, Ph.D.

Delusional disorder has long been recognized in the psychiatric nomenclature, however,
low prevalence rates and prevailing clinical views about the seemingly refractory nature
of delusional disorder have restricted data on clinical treatment outcomes for this illness.
Similar perspectives have been noted in forensic settings where minimal data is available
to guide standards of care for incompetent to stand trial (IST) delusional pretrial
defendants. Rationale. While the factors explicated in Sell provide guidelines for the
involuntary medication of defendants found IST, numerous questions are left unanswered
regarding the restorability of pretrial delusional detainees. The proposed study
investigated the competency restoration rates of defendants with delusional symptoms
and, more broadly, using the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS) assessed how these
symptoms impact competency related abilities. Method. Data were gathered from
competency restoration reports at a federal medical center. A total of 232 cases were
drawn with replacement from a five year span, and then coded for demographic, clinical,
and psycholegal variables. Results. Nearly 60% of defendants suffered with one or more
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delusions, and the delusional ideation for those who met the BPRS threshold for a
delusional disorder (DD) classification was more pervasive than for those in either the
schizophrenia or mood with psychosis subgroups. Defendants in the DD subgroup were
also more likely to refuse treatment. The logistic regression model showed adequate
overall classification (63.4%) and one static variable, i.e., prior psychiatric treatment,
reached statistical significance; indicating that those with such a history were less likely
to be restored. Discussion. The high rates of treatment refusal for DD defendants meant
that most of these defendants were opined IST after their first statutorily determined
competency restoration period, however, this group was no less likely to be opined
restorable by forensic examiners given an adequate trial of involuntary treatment with
antipsychotic agents.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Delusional disorder, previously falling under the broad designation of paranoia,
has been recognized for centuries (Fennig, Fochtmann, & Bromet, 2005). In the past
paranoia, derived from ancient Greek para (beside) and nous (mind), was typically used
as a common reference to madness (and even dementia). Emil Kraepelin (1904/1917)
considered the concept of paranoia inextricably bound to the development of psychiatry
as a discipline and, presently, persecutory or paranoid beliefs are recognized as the most
prevalent theme underpinning the delusions of psychotic patients (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000). The presence of nonbizarre delusions with the relative absence of
other forms of psychopathology is a central feature of delusional disorder. In non-clinical
populations, rates of delusional ideation have been reported to be between 10-15% while
another 1-3% of people in the general population evidence delusional beliefs that reach
clinical significance (Freeman, 2006). As a diagnostic entity delusional disorder has been
better delineated in the fourth edition of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV; APA, 1994) and the subsequent DSM-V (APA, 2013). The
nosological differentiation from schizophrenia and mood disorders has allowed for a slow
but steady increase in clinical research on this disorder. Still, as Fennig and colleagues
(2005) indicate the nosological status of delusional disorder has been subject to intense
debate since the early taxonomic contributions on paranoia by Kraepelin (1904/1917).
The number of inmates in the United States with major mental illness has steadily
risen (Lamberti & Weisman, 2004). At the same time mental health concerns in offender
populations are brought up with some regularity in pre-trial proceedings, especially for
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cases where adjudicative competence is at issue. Nationwide there are close to 60,000
competency evaluations conducted annually (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000), and the financial
burden and time associated with adjudicative competence has been well documented
(Golding, 1992). Most defendants referred for competency restoration are successfully
treated; consequently the accurate identification of those who respond poorly holds
significant value (Zapf & Roesch, 2009) within this criminal justice domain.
Current research indicates that defendants found incompetent to stand trial (IST)
under Dusky v. United States (1960) usually suffer from more severe clinical disorders,
predominantly psychotic disorders (Otto, 2006). Patients living with delusional disorder
seldom, if ever, seek treatment voluntarily as they typically deny having a mental illness.
Additionally, the quality of their psychotic symptoms often does not rise to the point of
serious functional impairment in their daily lives. However, their contact with mental
health professionals is often precipitated by some legal dilemma (Felthous, Stanislaus,
Hempel, & Gleyzer, 2001), but related treatment outcome data for IST defendants
diagnosed with delusional disorder is severely limited.
The literature on the treatment of delusional disorder mostly consists of individual
case reports of non-randomized studies with small sample sizes. Further, treatment
guidelines for this condition are typically gleaned from the protocols of other psychotic
disorders such as schizophrenia where more effort has been expended on studies of
treatment efficacy (Felthous et al., 2001). Also contributing to the scarcity of data on the
restorability rates of delusional defendants is the notion, both in the clinical (Manschrek
& Khan, 2006) and forensic literature (Liokis & Herbert, 2005), that delusional disorder
is highly stable and resistant to treatment. For example, psychiatric testimony proffered in
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United States v. Ghane (2004) before the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals explained that
only 10% of these patients experience symptom reduction when treated with
psychotropic medication, suggesting a very low probability for competency restoration.
To date the number of studies investigating competency restoration for defendants
diagnosed with delusional disorder (DD) have been negligible. The current study hopes
to add to the small body of research on CST restoration, and to expand existing
knowledge about restoration outcomes for DD defendants. Further, a focus on specific
symptoms and their role on CST restoration rather than diagnostic categories can
potentially provide a more nuanced understanding of competency restoration efforts for
this group of defendants.
The first part of the literature review provides an overview of the diagnostic
evolution of DD - from early links to paranoid ideation to current diagnostic
understanding. A number of scholars have given this subject more comprehensive
coverage (see for example, Kendler, 1981; Lewis, 2009; Schifferdecker & Peters, 1995).
The introductory section focuses on the diagnostic underpinnings of delusional disorder,
and thereafter treatment and outcome data for this psychotic disorder is reviewed, The
primarily focus in this section is on the treatment of delusional disorder, and concludes
with an explication of the forensic implications for pretrial incompetent to stand trial
(IST) defendants diagnosed with this condition.
The latter part of the literature review provides an outline of competency to stand
trial (CST), specifically procedural aspects, and then addresses competency restoration.
Here the discussion of competency restoration or treatment in the forensic context is
more extensive than the much broader legal concept of competency. Finally, a review of
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DD within the context of CST restoration is delineated, concluding with the research
questions relevant for the current study
Chapter Three of this study outlines the methodology with the results section
presented in Chapter Four. The final chapter provides a discussion of the results gleaned
from the current study. Here the caveats and limitations of the current study are also
addressed. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the strengths of the study and
potential avenues for future studies.
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Chapter Two
Delusional disorder: Treatment and Competency Restoration
Nosological Development of Paranoid Disorders
Paranoid disorders were a common subject of focus in the psychiatric writings of
the eighteenth and nineteenth century. A notable predecessor to Kraepelin’s classification
of paranoia was Karl Kahlbaum (1878/2007) whose work illustrated the anomalous
nature of paranoid ideation across a range of medical conditions. Kahlbaum devoted
much attention to the prognostic features of mental illness and derived much of his
understanding from clinical observation. He argued that paranoia was a subgroup of
partial psychosis with no underlying organic etiology. Prognostically he viewed paranoia
as a chronic disease characterized by intellectual symptoms that remained constant over
time (Kahlbaum, 1878/2007).
A seminal contribution in Kraepelin’s (1904/1917) diagnostic classification
system of paranoia was his differentiation of this illness from dementia praecox (or
schizophrenia) and manic-depressive insanity (or bipolar mood disorder). This taxonomy
not only gave prominence to paranoia within psychiatric annals, but formed the basis for
the formal introduction of delusional disorder (DD) some seven decades later. Kraepelin
frequently revised his ideas on paranoia, outlining the complexity of this concept in
subsequent editions of his textbook. Kraepelin (1904/1917), like Kahlbaum before him,
formulated his conclusions from observing the natural course of the illness rather than
etiological factors, which remain relatively obscure even to this day. Kraeplin considered
paranoia a chronic illness marked by the presence of a fixed delusional system, an
absence of hallucinations, and a personality left largely intact. Muck like Kahlbaum
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(1878/2007), who identified intellectual symptoms as fundamental to paranoia, Kraepelin
(1917) wrote, “[I]n this delusionary working-up the considerable weakness of judgment
(emphasis retained) of the patient becomes very apparent” (p.146). Kraepelin identified
four delusional subtypes: persecutory, jealous, grandiose, and hypochondriacal and, for
the most part, delusions have been classified by their content and/or theme ever since.
Subsequent attempts to better delineate paranoid disorders were made by Karl
Jaspers (1963), who viewed delusions as “pathologically falsified judgments” (p.95). In
his clinical observations Jaspers noted that the beliefs of patients with this illness were
often held with a strong subjective certainty or conviction, were incorrigible, and were
characterized by a falsity of content. However, Jaspers only provided a guideline for the
clinical assessment of delusions and duly cautioned, “[simple] definition will not dispose
of this matter” (Jaspers, 1963, p.93). His overall view of delusions was that they were not
understandable or incomprehensible and, consequently, not amenable to psychological
inquiry. Instead, he argued, they were to be viewed phenomenologically (via the
expression of the patient) and not on the basis of their content.
Large multisite studies examining the broader construct of delusions have
reported some plasticity in delusional content over time, and associated persistence of
delusions with a range of factors. These include older age, a diagnosis of schizophrenia,
and marital status (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Vesselinov, 2004). Still, even today
observations about the chronicty and seemingly autochthonous nature of delusional
disorder continue to confound treatment and prognostic outlooks. While the former
implies a resistance to treatment, the latter alludes to a possible explanation for the
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limited controlled treatment trials for delusional disorder and, why drug studies tend to
lump delusional disorder together with other psychotic spectrum disorders.

Diagnostic Classification
Initial diagnostic classifications (e.g., DSM-I, 1952; DSM-II, 1968) did not distinctly
rule out hallucinations in non-schizophrenic paranoid conditions; however, DSM-III-R
(1987) saw the formal introduction of the term delusional disorder (DD) and, with that, a
move away from the less circumscribed paranoid disorder outlined in previous
classifications(see Table 1). The current diagnostic classification (DSM-V) lists DD
under the category of psychotic disorders, where the primary distinction from other
disorders in this category is the presence of a delusion in the relative absence of other
psychotic features (APA, 2013). Functional impairment, when present, is directly
attributable to the delusion rather than to other psychotic symptoms. The current DSM-V
definition of DD essentially retains the Kraepelian conception of the illness; a position
that views DD as distinct from schizophrenia and bipolar mood disorder.
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Table 1
Historical Overview of the Prognostic Outlook
Data Source

Diagnostic label

Comments on prognosis

Kahlbaum (1878/2007)

Paranoia

Incurable, may progress to dementia

Kraepelin (1904/1917)

Paranoia

Chronic with limited deterioration in
personality

Jaspers (1923/1963)

Primary delusions

Chronic with a concomitant change in
personality

DSM I ( 1952)

Paranoid reactions

Persistent with intelligence preserved

DSM II (1968)

Paranoid states

Minimal differentiation from course of
schizophrenia

DSM-III-R (1987)ª

Delusional disorder

Relatively variable course, ranges from
chronic to periods of full remission
without relapse

DSM-IV (1994) & DSM-

Delusional disorder

IV-TR (2000)

Similar to DSM-III-R, better prognosis for
persecutory type associated with a
precipitating event

DSM-V

Delusional disorder

Disorder generally stable, although some
patients later develop schizophrenia

ª Introduces term delusional disorder as a distinct diagnostic entity
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A number of conditions need to be ruled out prior to a diagnosis of DD, such as
schizophrenia (paranoid type), psychotic mood disorder, dementia, drug-induced
psychotic disorder, hypochondriasis, and paranoid personality disorder.
Some early scholars, notably Jaspers, eschewed the prevailing content-based
classification of delusions; but, while he argued for a phenomenological approach
(Jaspers, 1963), more recent authors have argued for a dimensional characterization of
delusions (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Roth, 1999). For example, empirical data from large
multisite studies have shown some plasticity (variable intensity) and shifts in delusional
content over time (Appelbaum, Robbins, & Vesselinov, 2004), pointing to the limitations
of the current content dominated nosology of delusions. Nevertheless, current
classification of DD defines delusions as "fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in
the light of conflicting evidence" (APA, 2013) and subdivides delusions based on their
content. Historically delusions, hallucinations, thought disorder, disorganized/abnormal
behavior, and negative symptoms are the domains comprising psychotic illness. And.
DD is the only psychotic disorder characterized by a disturbance in only one of the
aforementioned five domains. The principle subtypes are outlined below based on DSMV criteria.


Persecutory: The central theme of the delusion is that one (or someone to whom
one is close) is under attack, being harassed, persecuted, or conspired against.



Jealous: A delusion that one's intimate partner is unfaithful.



Erotomanic: A delusion where the individual believes another person, usually of
higher social status, is in love with him/her.
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Grandiose: The overriding theme of this delusion is one of inflated self-worth,
power, knowledge, identity, or that one has a special relationship to a deity or
famous person



Somatic: The delusion that one has some physical defect or general medical
condition. In an effort to distinguish the somatic type from body dysmorphic
disorder DSM-V is expected to classify this type solely on the delusion that the
person has some medical condition (APA, 2010).



Mixed type: This involves a combination of two or more of the types described
above.
The prevailing diagnostic nomenclature defines a delusion as a fixed rather than

"erroneous" (as in DSM-IV), belief that remains intractable in the face of contradictory
evidence. In the current DSM nosology a delusion can be nonbizarre (conceivable events
that can occur in everyday life) or bizarre, which involves phenomenon that others in the
individual’s culture would regard as completely implausible. The prior emphasis on the
bizarreness, often a complex, mercurial concept, of a delusion presented special
challenges—a fact that has not gone unrecognized in the prevailing diagnostic
nomenclature. Typically, the bizarreness of a delusion is inferred from its cultural and
objective implausibility, but prior operational definitions have not been satisfactory, and
a number of researchers have questioned the overall reliability of bizarre delusions
(Cermolacce, Sass, & Parnas, 2010; Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006). These conceptual
shortcomings have, to a considerable extent, bolstered the argument against the
sufficiency of a single bizarre delusion for diagnosing schizophrenia, and contributed to
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some substantive revisions of psychotic spectrum disorders in the most recent diagnostic
classification.
Aside from discarding the DSM-IV subtypes of schizophrenia another notable
change in DSM-V is that a bizarre delusion no longer precludes a differential diagnosis of
DD. Presently a solitary bizarre delusion on criterion A is no longer sufficient for a
diagnosis of schizophrenia. As a consequence current conceptualization of DD allows for
a single bizarre or nonbizarre delusion. DSM-V also allows for severity ratings of
delusions, although diagnosis can be made independent of severity specifiers. Finally, to
delineate DD more clearly from obsessive-compulsive disorder and body dysmorphic
disorder the latter conditions now represent distinct diagnoses (with or without psychotic
features) as opposed to the dual diagnosis classified in earlier editions.
Although these subsequent editions of the DSM endeavored to distinguish
delusional disorder from schizophrenia and mood disorders, delusions remain common to
the latter two disorders. This is further borne out in cross cultural studies with
schizophrenia, which show that persecutory ideation is by far the most common content
in the delusions of schizophrenic patients (Stompe et al., 1999). In terms of mood
disorders, empirical evidence indicates that a fair number of patients who suffer from
depression (Manschrek & Khan, 2006) and bipolar mood disorder (Goodwin & Jamison,
2007) experience persecutory delusions during acute episodes. Specifically, Goodwin and
Jamison found persecutory ideation to be a feature in 29% of manic episodes. As Munro
(1988) pointed out more than two decades ago, "the relationship between affective and
delusional disorders is a complex one, but there is no doubt that a relationship exists"
(p.176).
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Additional evidence for this connection is found in pharmacotherapy reviews that
show some effectiveness for antidepressants in combination with antipsychotics when
treating delusional disorder (Manschrek & Khan, 2006). Taken together, the
aforementioned findings suggest that the present day clinical picture and treatment of
delusional disorder continues to reflect its shared nosological roots with schizophrenia
and mood disorders.
Epidemiology. Existing data suggests 10-15% of non-clinical samples report
delusional ideation, while an estimated 1-3% of people in the general population report
delusional beliefs that reach clinical significance (Freeman, 2006). The prevalence rate
(0.02%) for DD is low, with a lifetime morbidity risk of 0.05% to 0.1% (APA, 2013) and
patients in this diagnostic category seldom seek treatment voluntarily. However, with the
recent changes (the inclusion of a single bizarre delusion) to diagnostic classification
mental health professionals will no doubt see an increase in prevalence rates for DD.

Treatment of Delusional Disorder
Differences in treatment response time for psychotic symptoms contributes to the
clinical lore that DD is difficult to treat. For example, Gunduz-Bruce et al. (2005)
reported significantly longer treatment response times (in days) for delusions (median =
76, M = 150, SD = 239) compared to hallucinations (median = 27, M = 59, SD = 104) for
a sample (N = 118) suffering first episode schizophrenia.
Psychological Treatment. A review of the extant literature suggests that treatment
outcomes for DD are variable. Evidence for this conclusion was found in the MacArthur
Violence Risk Assessment Study by Appelbaum et al., (2004), which simultaneously
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underscored both the chronicity and change in delusions over time. Using DSM-III
diagnostic criteria, Appelbaum et al. (2004) collected baseline and follow-up (five
interviews) data from more than 1,000 psychiatric patients in this multisite study. Their
findings suggest marked variability in the content and intensity of delusions over time,
but they also found that certain factors increased the likelihood of persistent delusions,
e.g., a baseline diagnosis of schizophrenia.
To date no structured psychological treatment for DD has been delineated and
research in the area mainly consists of single case reports or studies with small
nonrandomized samples yielding mixed results. For example, Chadwick and Lowe
(1994) reported a reduction in delusional convictions over a six month period for most of
their sample (N=12) using verbal challenges and reality testing. In contrast, Sharp et al.
(1996), using the same CBT techniques as the former authors, reported significantly
lower response rates.
More broadly, cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT), which has been applied in the
treatment of schizophrenia, has only recently been used to treat DD (Manschrek & Khan,
2006), where part of the therapy centers on a collaborative effort between patient and
therapist to evaluate the facts of the delusional beliefs and to work on mistrust. According
to O’Connor et al. (2007), current practice in the CBT for delusional disorder comprises
three stages: preparing the patient for therapy, cognitive challenges of the delusional
conviction(s), and reality testing to allow for disconfirmation of the false conviction(s).
More recent data has found weak to moderate main effects on various dimensions
of the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule (MADS) for CBT compared with an
attention placebo control (APC) (O’Connor et al., 2007). Unfortunately, the sample size
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for this study was rather small thus limiting any clinical conclusions. Current clinical
practice shows that psychotropic medication remains the first line of treatment for this
group of psychotic patients1. Still, the moderate success of CBT approaches suggests that
DD is not impervious to psychological intervention.
Pharmacotherapy. The first line of treatment for schizophrenia and other
psychotic disorders such as DD is antipsychotic (neuroleptic) medication. As with
psychotherapeutic intervention, drug treatment studies of DD are also limited by
insufficient scientific data. As Smith and Buckley (2006) note, “there is not a single
randomized, controlled psycho-pharmacological trial for treating this [delusional
disorder] illness” (p.351). However, these authors made the point that certain newer
second generation antipsychotics (SGAs), e.g., olanzapine, aripirazole, and quietiapine,
may prove effective in the treatment of DD. Further, since no specific class of medication
is indicated for the treatment of DD, guidelines for treatment are typically gleaned from
the protocols of other psychotic disorders, such as schizophrenia, where more effort has
been expended on studies of efficacious treatment (Felthous et al., 2001). Together these
factors have severely limited any systematic evaluation of the prognostic features of DD.
Before the advent of atypical antipsychotics a few clinical studies showed
efficacy for the orally administered older first generation antipsychotic (FGA) Pimozide
in the treatment of DD and clinical consensus continues to support its use (O’Connor et
al., 2007). For example, in a review of 209 clinical case reports, Munro and Mok (1995)
reported a recovery rate of 68.5% for the 143 patients treated with Pimozide2. The rest of

Additionally illustrated in the Supreme Court’s comparison of amicus briefs in Sell v. United State (2003)
submitted by the American Psychological Association (Amicus Curiae 10-14) and the American
Psychiatric Association et al. (Amici Curiae 13-22).
2
Also see McCoy; Schwarzkopf, and Martin (1992) who cite successful outcomes in a number of cases.
1
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the patients in their sample were treated with other typical antipsychotics such as
haloperidol and thioridazine. Further, these authors reported total or partial recovery for
approximately 80% of cases (Munro & Mok, 1995). Based on these results they
concluded that DD, contrary to widespread opinions, has treatment outcomes comparable
to other psychiatric conditions.
Manschrek and Khan (2006) conducted a follow up on the work of Munro and
Mok (1995), reviewing published cases from a number of databases over a ten year
period (1994-2004). They identified a total of 224 cases and from those cases with
sufficient outcome data (n=134) they reported results consistent with those of Munro and
Mok (1995). Manschrek and Khan (2006) reported full recovery in nearly half (49.3%) of
the cases reviewed while 10.4% of the sample showed no improvement. Another notable
finding, from Manschrek and Khan's (2006) study was the significantly better response
rates for somatic delusions compared to other subtypes. Most patients in their study had a
favorable response to treatment regardless of the type of antipsychotic medication
administered. By extension, their study found no statistically significant difference in
outcome rates between patients treated with FGAs and SGAs.
This is an important finding given the drug safety concerns associated with older
FGAs such as Pimozide. The side effect profile of FGAs has been well documented in the
extant literature and is notable for movement disorders such as tardive dyskinesia,
Parkinsonian effects, dystonic reactions, and akathisia. For example, Elmer, George and
Petersen (2000) cited a number of adverse side effects associated with Pimozide such as
tardive dyskinesia and, more seriously, cardiac conduction defects (Food and Drug
Administration, 2002). The subsequent predominance of SGAs in recent years is largely
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attributable to their more circumscribed side effects profiles. Although no less serious the
adverse effects of these newer drugs include inter alia sedation, hypotension, weight gain,
and decreases in white blood cell counts.
What more recent clinical reviews, such as the study conducted by Manschrek
and Khan (2006), show is that atypical antipsychotic medication or SGAs (e.g.,
Risperidone) may hold some promise in the treatment of DD; above and beyond the
limited data citing the efficacy of older, typical (FGAs) psychotropic agents. Additional
data point to the usefulness of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) but to date
no controlled studies have been conducted to determine the efficacy of these drugs. In
addition, current drug therapies not only allude to the nosological link between DD and
other psychotic and mood disorders, but also point to the prevalence of polypharmacy
(Manschrek & Khan, 2006), often comprising different combinations of antipsychotics
and antidepressants.
A notable methodological caveat inherent to all the preceding clinical reviews,
which Manschrek and Khan (2006) acknowledge, is the reluctance of researchers/
clinicians to publish data on failed cases. In addition, these studies rate recovery on a
continuum, thus relying on clinical judgment rather than on objective outcome measures.
Notwithstanding these findings, which show some amenability to treatment for DD, the
long held notion that this psychotic disorder is highly stable and resistant to treatment
persists within both clinical (Manschrek & Khan, 2006) and forensic mental health
settings (Liokis & Herbert, 2005).
The pronounced lack of insight inherent to DD drives these patients' characteristic
opposition to psychiatric treatment and as a result they are left largely undetected by
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public health practitioners. Unsurprisingly, when these individuals do make contact with
mental health professionals it often occurs against the backdrop of some litigious
undertaking or criminal complaint (Goldstein, 1995; Felthous, Stanislaus, Hempel, &
Gleyzer, 2001). When individuals with paranoid ideation, who are characteristically
querulous and suspicious, encounter the criminal justice system “[p]aranoid concerns
may result in a range of troublesome or dangerous behaviors, from litigiousness and
morbid jealousy, to more violent crimes” (Goldstein, 1995, p.304). Delusional
convictions may impact a defendant's reasoning and actions across a range of legal
domains, e.g., competency to confess or testamentary capacity in matters of civil
litigation. When there is credible doubt that a defendant’s competency may be impaired
the courts have a vested interest, based on the concept of fundamental fairness and due
process protections, to take remedial action.
The goal of competency evaluations is the determination of how the underlying
clinical disorder impacts functional components of competency. As such, the incorrigible
fault in judgment or thinking inherent to DD, long since recognized by scholars
(Kahlbaum, 1878/2007; Kraepelin, 1904/1917; Jaspers 1923/1963), renders defendants
with this illness ever more susceptible to such functional impairment, especially given the
explicit emphasis on rational ability set out in current competency standards. Beyond
mere factual knowledge about courtroom proceedings, problems with decisional capacity
and the ability to work collaboratively with counsel in the pursuit of workable defense
strategies underlines some of the challenges for defendants suffering with DD. The study
now turns to a review of competency to stand trial and those factors salient to initial
competency.
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Competency to Stand Trial
Standard and Procedural Aspects. Criminal competency encompasses a sizable
portion of the judicial landscape ranging from pretrial issues such as competency to
confess to posttrial matters involving sentencing. Over the years the Supreme Court has
rendered a number of landmark decisions on criminal competency including, but not
limited to, Dusky v. United States (1960), Godinez v. Moran (1993), and Indiana v.
Edwards (2008). Even though courts recognize Dusky as the constitutionally minimal
competency standard, subsequent Supreme Court decisions demonstrates the breadth and
complexity of this legal construct. For example, in Godinez the Court proffered Dusky as
a unitary competency standard, and more recently, appeared to rule against the latter
notion by denying self-representation (a higher competency standard as argued by the
majority) for an otherwise competent to stand trial, but mentally ill defendant in
Edwards.
The law requires, based on the principles of fundamental fairness and due process
protection, and to maintain the dignity of the adversarial process, that defendants be
sufficiently present' to participate in the legal proceedings against them. By far the most
commonly requested psycholegal evaluation across jurisdictions is for competency to
stand trial (CST) or fitness to proceed. Estimates place the annual number of courtordered referrals for CST evaluations around 60,000 across the United States (Bonnie &
Grisso, 2000) with concomitant financial expenditure that runs into hundreds of millions
of dollars. And, although the specific statutes for CST vary across jurisdictions all states
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share common procedural underpinnings as well as the constitutionally minimal standard
as set out in Dusky3
In Dusky v. United States (1960) the Supreme Court held that a defendant must
have “sufficient present ability to consult with counsel” and a “reasonable degree of
rational” as well as factual “understanding of the proceedings against him” (p. 402).
Unlike mental state at the time of the offense CST refers to a defendant's mental state at
the time of the trial, i.e., ability present during legal proceedings. Consequently being
uncooperative or unwilling, or mere ignorance of criminal proceedings would not
preclude a finding of competency.
In criminal courts, competency implies an ability to understand the legal
proceedings at hand and to participate meaningfully in the trial processes, what
constitutes the sine qua non of a just legal system. The constitutionally minimal standard
set out in Dusky (1960) serves to safeguard those with sufficiently severe impairment of
their competence-related abilities, whether through mental illness and/or cognitive
impairment, ensuring they are not put on trial without an assessment (and if needed
remediation) of the aforementioned abilities.
The determination of competency involves a number of stages and is generally set
in motion by a request for an evaluation of a defendant‘s CST. This initial request can be
raised by any officer of the court and can occur at any given stage of adjudication
whenever a "bona fide doubt" exists about a defendant's competency (Grisso, 2003). The
US Supreme Court articulated the “bona fide doubt” standard in Drope v. Missouri
(1975), and ruled that court principals (judge, defense, and/or prosecutor) had an

3

Subsequent cases such as Drope, Weiter, Godinez, and Edwards have elaborated on the Dusky standard.
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affirmative duty to raise competency concerns when warranted. An array of
circumstances can set a CST evaluation in motion. For example, difficulties
communicating with defense counsel, volatile or odd behavior displayed in the
courtroom, the bizarreness of the alleged offense, or a prior history of IST can all prompt
requests for competency evaluations.
Following the court’s motion for an evaluation, the defendant is then evaluated by
one or more mental health professionals, typically while still incarcerated (although a
number of states also permit more cost-effective outpatient evaluation). Evaluation
methods for CST vary across jurisdictions and mental health professionals and, as Cooper
and Zapf (2003) point out, there is no singular, standardized tool to assess CST. The
volume and quality of CST assessment instruments has seen steady development over the
past few decades. Assessment in this area often includes structured, criterion-based
psycholegal instruments (see Otto, 2006; see Scott, 2003) to more traditional measures of
psychopathology and personality (Pirelli, Gottdiener, & Zapf, 2011). An effective CST
evaluation will underscore the impact of a defendant's mental illness on their ability to
understand the proceedings against them, and their ability to rationally assist defense
counsel. Therefore, the fundamental determination for the forensic examiner is how "any
psychopathological or cognitive difficulties [relate] to possible impairments in the
defendant’s psycholegal abilities” (Skeem & Golding, 1998, p. 358).
If a judicial finding of IST is made following the court-ordered evaluation, a
defendant is typically remanded to a period of inpatient treatment in a forensic mental
health facility with the goal of competency restoration. Across most jurisdictions the
forensic examiner will then offer an opinion about a defendant's competency, but the
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ultimate opinion rests with the trier of fact. However, as Zapf, Hubbard, Cooper,
Wheeles, & Ronan (2004) point out, more often than not courts appear to abdicate this
judicial opinion to forensic examiner s/clinicians.
Existing research suggests that approximately 1 of every 4 defendants referred for
a CST evaluation is adjudicated IST. Single studies with relatively large samples, for
example Hubbard et al. (2003) with 468 defendants remanded for CST evaluation in
Alabama, place the rate of IST findings around 20%. This is consistent with the modal
estimate made by Roesch, Zapf, Golding, & Skeem (1999), and a recent meta-analytic
study placing the base rate for IST findings at 27.5% (Pirelli et al., 2011).
Defendants adjudicated competent proceed to trial, but when a defendant is found
unfit to proceed or IST other potential outcomes unfold. Cases involving relatively minor,
misdemeanor offenses are typically dismissed often with the agreement that the
defendant will seek treatment. However, defendants are generally remanded when found
IST to allow for a period of competency restoration. Jackson v. Indiana laid the
groundwork for the adjudication of pretrial IST defendants, and the curtailment of
indefinite civil commitment as a substitute for a criminal trial. In 1968, based on the
existing statutes at the time, an Indiana court committed a Theon Jackson (a pretrial IST
defendant) to the state Department of Mental Health until such time as he could be
certified "sane". Mr. Jackson was deaf, mute, and illiterate, and charged with robbery.
Defense counsel argued that Mr. Jackson's commitment was tantamount to
indefinite/lifelong commitment since his condition was irremediable. After granting
certiorari the US Supreme Court ultimately held in Jackson (1972) that a defendant
found IST could not be held beyond a "reasonable period of time necessary to determine
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whether there is a substantial probability" of CST restoration "in the foreseeable future"
(p.738). Those not likely to be restored could either be civilly commitment or released,
absent a finding of dangerousness.
Current data show that a number of states statutorily require IST defendants to be
re-evaluated for adjudicative competence at least once every 6 months during the course
of restoration (Grisso, Borum, Edens, Moye, & Otto, 2003). Additional time beyond the
initial term for restoration is generally granted in cases where a reasonable likelihood of
restoration exists. In cases where defendants are not restored to competency following a
reasonable period of time, they are likely to be (conditionally) released pursuant to
Jackson v. Indiana (1972) if they do not pose a substantial risk of harm. The duration of
such commitments for restoration are statutorily determined, either comprising a set
period of time or a proportion of the length of the sentence the defendant may have
received if he were (competent and) convicted. In Jackson the Court did not explicitly
specify what a "reasonable period" is and the statutes setting out the confinement periods
of pretrial IST defendants varies notably across states. According to Kaufman, Way, and
Suardi (2012) 28% of states specify a period of 1 year or less, 22% link the time period to
the penalty of the charged offense, 20% specify a period of 1 to 10 years while another
30% do not specify a limit.
The extant literature shows that defendants found IST typically suffer from more
severe clinical disorders (Otto, 2006) and scholars consistently report a significant
relationship between psychosis and adjudicative incompetence (Caldwell, Mandraccia,
Ross, & Silver, 2003; Cooper & Zapf, 2003; Skeem, Golding, Cohn, & Berge, 1998;
Pirelli et al., 2011; Warren, Rosenfeld, Fitch, & Hawk, 1997; Warren et al., 2006).
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Overall, current research suggests that defendants diagnosed with a psychotic disorders
are found IST at a greater rate (Hubbart, Zapf, & Ronan, 2003). It is worth noting that a
number of other variables have also been associated with IST outcomes (e.g., previous
psychiatric hospitalization and unemployment). However, of the eight (sex; race; marital
status; employment status; psychiatric diagnosis; psychiatric hospitalization history, CST
evaluation history; and index criminal charge) variables examined in the meta-analysis by
Pirelli et al. (2011) only psychiatric diagnosis and employment status showed statistical
significance. Defendants with a psychotic disorder were eight times as likely to be found
IST while the same likelihood was increased twofold for an unemployed defendant. The
reader is referred to Pirelli et al. (2011) for a more comprehensive coverage of salient
CST determinants.
As a symptom of psychotic illness delusional beliefs, although not always bizarre,
may come to incorporate a wide network of criminal justice principals4, and impair one
or more of a defendant’s functional (criminal) competency-related abilities under the
existing standards (e.g., competency to waive counsel and proceed pro se or competency
to stand trial). Specific to competency to stand trial (CST), the focus of the current study,
such impairment may include a defendant's ability to consult with counsel and/or his
thinking about the proceedings against him. For example, Litwack (2003), citing relevant
case law, illustrated the complexity in the adjudicative process brought about by the
delusional thinking of criminal defendants. Specifically, he argued how a defendant may
meet the threshold for competency to stand trial, but may not necessarily have the

In United States v. Ghane, 490 F.3d 1036 (2007), where the (criminal) defendant’s persecutory delusions
incorporate defense counsel and magistrates in civil cases.
4
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competency to refuse a (viable) counsel recommended insanity defense in order to pursue
their own delusionally moored defense.
Of course a diagnosis in and of itself provides little information about a
defendant’s ability to participate in judicial proceedings and is not synonymous with a
finding of IST. For example, one study found as many as 80% of defendants with a
psychotic disorder were ruled competent to stand trial by judges and mental health
professionals (Viljoen, Roesch, & Zapf, 2002). Under Dusky, the presence of a mental
disorder is only one step along the path of finding a defendant incompetent to proceed
and any psychopathology needs to be related to deficits in psycholegal functioning
(Skeem, Golding, Cohn, & Berge, 1998; Zapf & Roesch, 2009). As such the opposite
also holds true, i.e., psychiatric symptom alleviation for an IST defendant may not
necessarily mean successful restoration to competency.
The cost, both personal and societal, of an IST finding can be substantial. For the
defendant individual liberty is curtailed while states on their part incur a sizeable expense
for the custodial care of IST defendants. In addition, once a defendant has been found
incompetent to stand trial there is no failsafe way to predict his restorability.

Competency Restoration
There is a substantive body of research on initial evaluations and CST
adjudications whereas research on competency restoration has been rather limited. This
dearth of research on competency restoration is similarly highlighted by Zapf and Roesch
(2011) in their review of data in this area. A finding of IST is not a clinical condition but
a legal disposition and, as such, does not warrant clinical treatment. Also, there exists no
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standardized regimen for competency restoration. However, research has shown that most
defendants (upwards of 70%) initially found unfit to proceed are returned to court within
six months (Morris & Parker, 2008; Zapf & Roesch, 2011). Subsequent to a discussion of
competency restoration approaches a review of factors predictive of restorability is
provided.

Restoration Strategies
Most treatment programs for CST restoration aim to diminish psychiatric
symptoms while augmenting competency related abilities. CST restoration predominantly
occurs within inpatient forensic mental health settings and the administration of
psychotropic medication constitutes the most common treatment approach (Zapf &
Roesch, 2011).
Medication. The predominant use of antipsychotic medication across jurisdictions
for CST restoration is understandable given the association between psychosis and
findings of IST. In line with this, Zapf and Roesch (2009) note that successful outcomes
in competency restoration often rest on the defendant’s response to drug treatment.
However, over the past decade there has been a steady increase in the number of studies
examining CST restoration approaches other than pharmacological intervention. Many
restoration programs utilize a two-pronged approach of treating the underlying symptoms
with group-based formats of psycholegal instruction alongside psychotropic medication
(Meuller & Wylie, 2007). In these groups, defendants are instructed about basic legal
concepts and courtroom procedures using various didactic techniques (e.g., courtroom
simulation or mock trials). In addition, defendants may also receive short-term cognitive
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behavioral intervention to address psychological problems relevant to their competency
status. Overall, the body of research in this area is negligible (Mueller & Wylie, 2007;
Zapf & Roesch, 2011) with little agreement about the effectiveness of these interventions
in competency restoration (Mueller & Wylie, 2007).
Educational approaches. Although most pretrial defendants consent to treatment
with antipsychotic medication (Zapf & Roesch, 2011) there are instances where such
intervention is clinically not indicated and/or unwarranted. Further, the inherent
invasiveness of psychotropic medication to render a defendant CST highlights the
importance of alternative treatments. At least five previous studies have utilized
educational/problem-solving strategies in CST restoration. Three of these education
based approaches have utilized experimental designs (Mueller & Wylie, 2007; Bertman
et al., 2003; Siegel & Elwork, 1990).
The first study, using random assignment, examined the effectiveness of a
psycholegal intervention (a psycholegal game) specifically designed for competency
restoration (Mueller & Wylie, 2007). Delivered in a group format, the psycholegal game
(Fitness Game or FG) instructs participants with respect to key CST criteria and targets
problem solving and reasoning abilities. The control group in this study were
administered the Healthy Behaviors Game (HBG), which included material on symptom
management and substance abuse, but not legal material. Consistent with the findings of
Bertman et al. (2003), both the experimental (n = 21) and control (n = 17) groups in this
study showed significant pretest to posttest improvements on the 22-item MacArthur
Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication (MacCAT-CA). Overall Mueller
and Wylie (2007) reported relatively small effect sizes, ranging from 0.02 to 0.3, and no
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significant posttest differences between the two groups were found on the MacCAT-CA.
Their overall results did not support the use of the FG in competency restoration.
Bertman et al. (2003) assigned defendants to (1 of 3) treatment groups for
psycholegal competency restoration, and found that all groups showed significant
differences between pretest and posttest scores. The authors compared a legal rights
education group; a deficit focused remediation group; and a standard hospital treatment
group. Overall, treatment groups that included individual sessions fared better than the
treatment as usual/standard hospital group. Specifically, the legal right education group
and the deficit focused remediation group fared better on posttest scores of competency
assessment instruments. However, based on the treatment design, it was not clear whether
outcomes were attributable to the variable treatment formats (individual-group vs. grouponly intervention) and/or frequency of treatment. Bertman et al. (2003) argued that legal
rights education was effective and less resource intensive since they found no significant
difference between this intervention and the deficit remediation approach.
The final educational CST restoration approach to use experimental design was
Siegel and Elwork (1990). In their study the experimental group received
psychoeducation and instruction on legal concepts using video recording and discussion
of courtroom procedure. In addition, the experimental group also took part in group
problem solving sessions involving an actual legal case. These authors reported greater
improvement on the Competency Assessment Instrument scores for the experimental
(n=21) compared to the control (n=20) group. They also reported more CST
recommendations by hospital staff for the experimental group (45%) compared to the
control group (15%).
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The remaining two studies on competency restoration treatments did not use
random assignment. The first by Brown (1992) described a group based, didactic
intervention structured around five different modules: nature of criminal charges;
elements of specific charges; roles of participants in the trial process, the sequence of
events during the trial process; and the consequences of different legal decisions and
outcomes.
Noffsinger (2001) described a revised, multidisciplinary CST restoration
approach that compromised seven discrete modules that included different materials, i.e.,
video recordings of trials, a mock trial, videotaped vignettes, and a written test. The
modules included: education; anxiety reduction; a court officer guest lecture; a mock
trial; court proceedings video; post-restoration; and legal current events. Noffsinger
(2001) reported improvement in the overall length of stay for the new CST restoration
model compared to the earlier predominantly didactic program. He also reported
competency restoration rates greater than 85% for major felony offenses (and >90% for
lesser felonies).
Remediation for Cognitive Disability. Two studies have reported on CST
restoration for defendants with developmental disabilities (mental retardation). Anderson
and Hewitt (2002) reported on restoration outcomes for MR defendants detained at a
habilitation facility compared to those detained at a psychiatric hospital and found better
rates for the latter group (50% vs. 18%). The authors contend that the difference between
the two groups may be attributable to the greater accessibility to psychiatric medication at
the hospital facility. However, Anderson and Hewitt (2002) found that only one-third of
their overall sample was restored to competency.
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A training program for defendants with mental retardation focused on repeated
review to facilitate retention was described by Wall, Krupp, and Guilmette (2003). Their
program (Slater Method) includes five sequential modules: (a) the purpose of the
training, review of the charges, pleas, and potential consequences; (b) courtroom
personnel; (c) courtroom proceedings, trial, and plea bargain; (d)communicating with the
attorney, giving testimony, and assisting in defense; and (e) tolerating the stress of the
proceedings. These modules are presented over a six-month period and can be extended
in increments of six-months as required. Wall et al. (2003) reported CST restoration rates
consistent with those of Anderson and Hewitt for this group of defendants.
In summary, non-pharmacological competency restoration approaches suggest
there is some benefit to educational approaches that augment a defendant’s legal
knowledge. However, the effectiveness of restoration programs for defendants with
mental retardation appears to be limited. An important consideration across all restoration
programs involves their cost effectiveness and resource requirements. Standardized, less
time and labor intensive are likely to be prioritized. And for this reason, pharmacological
intervention often stands first. Over time CST restoration strategies outside of
psychotropic medication have evolved from basic instructive approaches to more varied
and targeted approaches. Although much research in this area remains to be done the
limited available data points to some benefit for adding legal education programs in CST
restoration.
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Factors Predictive of Restoration
Research on factors that predict successful restoration is not as comprehensive as
studies examining factors salient to initial competency status. While the body of research
examining predictors of initial CST status has grown steadily since the Supreme Court's
judgment in Dusky the number of studies investigating restoration of competency have
been negligible. The following section reviews a total of 6 studies, summarized in Table
2, in this area.

Table 2
CST Restoration Studies
Authors (N)

Restoration Status

Restoration Factor

Rodenhauser and Khamis (1988)

Adjudicated

Axis I disorder and history of
incarceration

Anderson and Hewitt (2002)

Adjudicated

Cognitive disability/lower IQ

Hubbard and Zapf (2003)

Predicted

Age and violent offense

Hubbard et al. (2003)

Predicted

Does not understand legal
proceedings

Mossman (2007)

Adjudicated

Major psychotic illness and
cognitive disability/MR

Wolber (2008)

Predicted

Cognitive disability/MR

Through archival reviews a number of scholars have identified variables salient to
predictions of restoration aside from responsiveness to psychotropic medication (Wolber,
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2008; Hubbard & Zapf, 2003; Hubbard et al., 2003). A 2008 survey of multiple forensic
mental health facilities and evaluation sites across 45 states indicated that severe
cognitive impairment (e.g., dementia or developmental disability) and refractory
psychosis were the primary reasons for defendants not being restored to competency
(Wolber, 2008). Severe cognitive impairment was the foremost reason for nonrestorability reported by 45 facilities in Wolber's telephone survey.
Hubbard and Zapf (2003) found evidence for criminal variables, i.e., violent index
offenses and previous criminal history, as predictors of restorability. They found that
defendants who were older and had a violent index offense were more likely to be found
not restored compared to the younger counterparts who had non-violent index offenses.
In addition, Hubbard and Zapf (2003) found defendants with non-psychotic minor
disorders, prior mental health contact, prior use of psychotropic medication, and prior
criminal histories more likely to be predicted restored. Together psychiatric diagnosis,
psychiatric history, criminal history, and violent index offense accounted for 28% of the
variance in their model with an accuracy rate of 53% (p < 0.001).
A number of state statutes require clinicians to render an opinion regarding the
likelihood of restoration once a defendant has been found IST. Alabama statutes in the
Hubbard et al. (2003) study similarly required clinicians to report on the likelihood of
restoration. Overall, they found defendants predicted restorable were more likely to have
a non-psychotic minor diagnosis, a past criminal history, and the ability to understand
legal proceedings. In contrast, those predicted non-restorable were more likely to lack
understanding of legal proceedings and were older. In the same way, Morris and Parker
(2008) also reported that those diagnosed with a mood disorders were more likely to be
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restored than defendants diagnosed with a major psychotic disorder (i.e., schizophrenia).
Together, these three studies provide data on factors predictive of CST restoration.
Some studies, on the other hand, have addressed the question of adjudicated CST
restoration outcomes more directly, and consistent with other findings in this area suggest
psychiatric variables (e.g., long-standing psychotic disorders with a history of extended
prior inpatient hospitalization) and irremediable cognitive disorders are important
determinants of non-restorability (Mossman, 2007; Anderson & Hewitt, 2002;
Rodenhauser & Khamis, 1988). In an archival review of adjudicated CST restoration
outcomes Mossman (2007) found that defendants with a major psychotic disorder
(schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder), mental retardation, extended hospital stays,
older age, and misdemeanor offense had a decreased likelihood (<35%) of being
adjudicated CST. Anderson and Hewitt (2002) explicitly examined the impact of mental
retardation on competency restoration. Those defendants who were restored in their
sample had significantly higher IQ scores than those who were not restored, M = 66.91 (p
< 0.01) vs. M = 57.54 (p < 0.01) respectively. Also, these authors found that African
American defendants were more likely to be restored than their White counterparts. In a
review of 376 defendants who had their restoration status adjudicated Rodenhauser and
Khamis (1988) found a number of significant predictors of CST restoration outcomes.
Defendants without a major Axis I disorder and no prior history of incarceration were
more likely to be adjudicated restored. Overall, the extant literature suggests irremediable
cognitive deficits and longstanding psychotic illness are inversely related to CST
restoration status while the data on past criminal history and offense type appear more
equivocal.
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Involuntary Medication and Restoration
In Harper (1990) the Supreme Court held that an individual has a "significant
constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs" (p.93). Even though the majority of IST defendants consent to drug
treatment (Zapf & Roesch, 2011) the constitutional right to refuse treatment has long
been upheld by the United States Supreme Court. While courts may consider educational
approaches to CST restoration less invasive the use of antipsychotic drugs remains by far
the leading method to achieve this goal, The rates of involuntary treatment of pretrial
defendants are not well known, but a recent study by Cochrane, Herbel, Reardon, and
Lloyd (2012) estimates that 1 in 36,000 federal defendants undergoes such treatment.
Moreover, data on rates of medication refusal for pretrial defendants is sparse. In the
absence of medication, the condition of a deluded individual would conceivably remain
unchanged and it is not uncommon for efforts to medicate to be incorporated into their
delusional system (Felthous et al., 2001). Consequently, delusional IST defendants with
impaired decisional capacity can go on to proffer seemingly rational reasons for refusing
treatment.
Prior to Sell v. United States (2003) incompetent pretrial defendants were
medicated based on Washington v. Harper (1990). Harper, who had been incarcerated in
a Washington correctional facility following a parole revocation, contended that he had
been denied a hearing to determine possible violation of due process by being forced to
take medication. Disagreeing with Harper the Supreme Court ruled that the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medication without a judicial hearing was acceptable in
cases of serious mental illness where an inmate posed a danger to himself or others. The
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Court further held that such involuntary medication should be in the inmate’s medical
interest. In many ways Harper set the standard for the forcible medication of pretrial
detainees. This permissible compromise set out by the Court also extends to instances of
grave disability.
Still, avoiding forcible medication is a constitutionally protected interest as
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Riggins v. Nevada (1992). In Riggins the Supreme
Court explicitly addressed forcible medication of pretrial detainees. In his appeal Riggins
argued that the state violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by forcibly
medicating him during trial (as he pursued an insanity defense). Mr. Riggins had been
convicted for capital murder and was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and later reversed the lower court’s decision holding that protections against
involuntary medication, absent overriding judicial interests or medical appropriateness,
also extend to pretrial detainees (as with inmates in Harper). In Riggins the Supreme
Court held that pretrial defendants had a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment
not to be forcibly medicated. The Court further held that Riggins was denied a full and
fair trial under the Sixth Amendment based on his argument that the adverse side effects
of his (involuntarily administered) antipsychotic medication (thioridazine) impaired his
competency during criminal proceedings.
After Riggins the landmark Supreme Court case of Sell v. United States (2003)
sought to elucidate the conditions for involuntary medication, specifically for
competency restoration of not yet adjudicated defendants. Charles Sell faced multiple
counts of Medicaid and mail fraud, and was ordered to undergo involuntary treatment
after the lower court held that he posed a danger to himself and others. Sell, who was
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diagnosed with a delusional disorder, appealed the decision of forcible medication by the
district court, a decision that the appellate court later affirmed. The Supreme Court, in a
6-to-3 decision, vacated and remanded the appellate decision. The Court held that
forcible medication for the sole purpose of competency restoration of a pretrial defendant
who is facing serious criminal charges was permissible under certain circumstances.
Therefore, before an order of involuntary medication can be issued, under Sell
four key factors have to be established. First, to bring a defendant accused of a serious
crime to trial the court must find that important governmental/state interests are at stake.
Second, the court has to find that forcible medication will significantly further these state
interests, and likely render the defendant competent to proceed. The court further has to
find that involuntary medication per se (and not another, perhaps less intrusive option) is
necessary to further the states interests. Finally, it has to be shown that drug treatment is
medically appropriate, and in the patient’s best medical interest. Since Sell was not a
danger to himself or others the Court subsequently held that he could not be forcibly
medicated without consideration of the aforementioned factors.
Upon cursory examination, the first and third prongs in Sell appear less fraught
with difficulty when confronted with a delusional defendant accused of a violent crime.
Governmental interests are generally greater for violent felonies and, as for the third
factor, the administration of neuroleptics drugs is widely viewed as the primary mode of
treatment for psychotic patients. However, the available data on treatment outcomes for
delusional patients and clinical perceptions suggests that factors two and four stipulated
in Sell may be particularly difficult to navigate.
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Firstly, the Supreme Court decision in Sell accentuated the importance of the
efficacy and side effect profiles of medications that are administered involuntarily in the
fourth prong of Sell. Even though the side effect profiles for newer antipsychotics are not
as troublesome, relatively recent data suggests that the use of first generation
antipsychotics remains prevalent in the treatment of delusional disorder (Herbel &
Stelmach, 2007). Medication side effects are not only important in terms of a pretrial
defendant's ability to assist counsel, but can also influence the trier of fact's perception of
a defendant. For example, a defendant's blunted affect during a trial, brought on by his
psychotropic medication, could be erroneously interpreted by a jury as a lack of remorse.
More recent cases, such as that of Jared Loughner in Tucson (AR), further
demonstrate the complexity of forcibly medicating pretrial defendants who are initially
considered non-dangerous while in custody. Loughner was initially able to obtain an
injunction against forcible medication after the Ninth Circuit Court found that
governmental interests to prevent harm to others was outweighed by his interest to avoid
the side effects of involuntary medication. The court argued that Loughner was under
custodial care for six months without any injury to anyone. However, this injunction was
later lifted by the same court after the government was able to successfully argue that
Loughner's deteriorating (and potentially dangerous) mental state posed a danger (to
himself). The government argued that antipsychotic medication was the sole method to
ameliorate this danger.
In reference to the second Sell prong, promoting concomitant governmental
interests implies that the medication administered will be substantially likely to restore a
pretrial defendant to competency. As noted, being found incompetent to stand trial is not
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a clinical condition, but the restoration of incompetent defendants does primarily rest on
medical intervention. Consequently, the relatively obscure prognostic profile and the
limited outcome data for delusional disorder have the potential to obfuscate any informed
judgment about the likelihood of competency restoration for this subset of pretrial
detainees.
A number of federal circuit courts have addressed the issue of involuntary
medication of delusional pretrial defendants subsequent to Sell (e.g., United States v.
Ghane, 2004; United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 2010). In Ghane, a defendant diagnosed
with delusional disorder, was found incompetent to stand trial and appealed an order of
involuntary medication. Hessam Ghane was facing federal charges for the possession of a
chemical weapon (potassium cyanide). The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals held that he
could not be medicated involuntarily based on the substantially likely (to restore
competence; second prong) factor set out in Sell v. United States (2003). After reviewing
testimony from at least four psychiatrists, the judge concluded that 90% of patients
diagnosed with delusional disorder do not improve with treatment and, reversing the
district court's decision, ruled that the state had not met the burden for establishing the
second Sell factor. The psychiatric testimony proffered explained that only a 10% of
these patients experience symptom reduction when treated with psychotropic medication
– a scenario where restoration to competency is improbable.
Similarly, consider the case of Ruiz-Gaxiola where the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision on forcible medication. Ruiz-Gaxiola, who had
an extensive criminal history and had entered the United States illegally, was diagnosed
with delusional disorder and sent to a Federal Medical Center (FMC) after being found
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IST. The court ruled, based primarily on defense expert testimony about the refractory
nature of the defendant’s clinical disorder, that involuntary medication for Ruiz-Gaxiola
was medically inappropriate (more so as he posed no danger to himself or others, as per
Harper, in the FMC).
Common to both cases and Sell is the defendants’ diagnosis (delusional disorder)
and one can recognize the weight accorded to the different Sell factors due in large part to
expert testimony proffered on the reputed prognostic profile of the disorder. Thus, the
contention previously highlighted in the psychiatric nosology around the prognosis of
delusional disorder can also inform forensic opinions albeit that subtle facts and evidence
surrounding each case supports the individual courts’ decisions. Taken together, the
circumstances for forcibly medicating an incompetent pretrial defendant as set out Sell
are not by any means straightforward.

Delusional Disorder and Restoration Outcomes
Within the context of the high base rate for restorability, Zapf and Roesch (2009)
note that the accurate identification of poor treatment responses holds the greatest
heuristic value, and further stress that the overall predictive accuracy of mental health
professionals in this area is low. Few defendants who are evaluated for CST are found
incompetent and even fewer of those are judged non-restorable. For defendants with
delusional disorder the dearth of empirical studies on treatment outcome rates further
compounds the probability of false positives (non-responders predicted to be restorable).
Relatively recent contributions such as those by Felthous et al. (2001) draw on
existing clinical literature in their discussion of defendants with delusional disorder. From
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their brief review of pharmacotherapy with persecutory delusions these authors make the
argument that atypical antipsychotics may be more favorable in the treatment of
delusions given their efficacy in thought disorders. In addition, they contend that mood
stabilizing agents may help curb the impulse to act in delusional patients (Felthous et al.,
2001). They ultimately argue for an approach that strikes a balance between patient
autonomy and treatment standards in the forensic setting. The review by Felthous and
colleagues also illustrates how the lack of clinical outcome data for delusional patients
can provide fertile ground for treatment refusal based on seemingly rational arguments.
Defendants (as with clinical patients) often provide a network of spurious evidence to
support their inferences where efforts to medicate are duly incorporated into the
delusional system.
To date there have only been two published studies directly investigating
competency restoration for defendants diagnosed with delusional disorder. In a
retrospective review of 22 pretrial federal cases of defendants who had undergone
involuntary medication hearings from 1990-2003, Herbel and Stelmach (2007) found
evidence of favorable treatment responses to a range of antipsychotic medications. The
majority of defendants in their sample (n = 16) suffered persecutory delusions, and close
to 60% of those defendants restored to competency were treated with a single typical
antipsychotic. In addition, all of the defendants in their sample showed a favorable
response to treatment after a minimum of three uninterrupted months of treatment, and
approximately 77% were considered restored to competence. Although the sample size
for this study was small the results open interesting avenues for future investigation, not
only regarding the restorability of pretrial DD defendants, but also whether specific
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delusional themes (e.g., persecutory themes involving governmental conspiracy)
differentially impact responsiveness to treatment.
A subsequent study by Cochrane et al. (2012) examined the rates and outcomes
for federal felony defendants who had undergone treatment under the Sell criteria. Fortyfour defendants in their overall sample (N = 287) were diagnosed with DD and of those
15 were granted an order of involuntarily treatment. The majority (73%) of those DD
defendants treated under Sell were restored to competency.
While these studies serve to advance our knowledge of treatment outcomes in
forensic settings for defendants diagnosed with DD their respective authors highlight a
number of methodological shortcomings. Aside from the standard limitations that plague
retrospective analysis, they also point to the small number of DD cases in their samples.
Notwithstanding, their findings are instructive and assist in orienting future studies, more
so when one considers the tentative argument that the forensic setting facilitates greater
adherence to medication trials, which, in turn, may show less than expected positive CST
restoration (and perhaps clinical) outcomes for defendants diagnosed with DD.

Rationale
Treatment outcome data for IST defendants with DD, and (more broadly) their
clinical counterparts, is severely limited. Notwithstanding, delusional ideation has been
broadly recognized as common to a number of psychotic disorders. Scholars have
reported prevalence rates between 10-15% for delusional ideation in non-clinical
populations (Freeman, 2006) and the recent de-emphasis on bizarreness in DSM-V points
to a likely increase in DD prevalence rates. However, the treatment of delusional disorder
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continues to lag behind partly due to low prevalence rates and the perception that this
illness is intractable. However, recent findings suggest that the course of the disorder is
variable, and that treatment often includes a broad spectrum of psychotropic drugs.
Similar perspectives and trends have been noted in forensic settings where minimal data
is available to guide standards of care for delusional, incompetent pretrial defendants.
Although the majority of defendants who are ruled IST suffer psychotic symptoms the
base rate for those with delusional disorder within this group is low, further limiting
efforts to study and treat this particular population. And, while the existing judicial
standard explicates guidelines for involuntary medication of IST defendants, numerous
questions are left unanswered, not merely as a result of the wording of the Sell standard,
but because of a clinical condition (DD) with no established treatment protocol and a
disputed prognostic profile. In the absence of data on treatment outcomes these
defendants face the prospect of protracted criminal commitment (Felthous et al., 2001)5.
A primary goal of the proposed study was to further our clinical understanding of
treatment efforts within the context of competency restoration as well as offer some
insight into existing forensic dispositions for DD IST defendants.
Some researchers in the area make the finer diagnostic distinction between
psychotic disorders, and argue that the trial period (and therefore time to restorability) for
treating DD in forensic samples exceeds that for schizophrenia (Herbel & Stelmach,
2007). In the same way, clinical trials with DD cases have been criticized for their
relatively short treatment duration (see for example Silva et al., 1998). However, current

5

Cf. Sell v. United States (2003) where the court suggests that lengthy confinement stemming from
medication refusal negates the risks associated with the release of a criminal defendant
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empirical data shows that the overwhelming majority of IST defendants receiving
inpatient treatment are restored within the statutory time frame (Zapf & Roesch, 2009).
Whether or not this particular conclusion holds true for DD defendants found
incompetent to proceed remains unclear. And so, another aim of the current study was to
exam whether the majority of DD pretrial defendants referred for restoration are indeed
restorable within an initial statutory timeframe (as with their other IST counterparts).
So, while not synonymous with clinical recovery, restoration of competency in
forensic settings for DD defendants should provide adequate trial periods for treatment.
Still, whether such outcomes are equally robust for purportedly intractable psychotic
disorders such as delusional disorder is not clear.
Further, the financial burden and time associated with adjudicative competence is
well documented (Golding, 1992) and the high base rate for competency restoration
suggests that the accurate identification of poor responses to treatment holds superior
heuristic value (Zapf & Roesch, 2009). More especially, most defendants found IST and
unlikely to be restored are housed in costly forensic mental health facilities. As a result,
identification of symptoms that contribute to decreased restorability could more readily
facilitate timely placement planning and intervention in less cost intensive settings, such
as transitional living facilities (TLF) or outpatient treatment centers.
Previous studies have predominantly focused on the relationship between broad
psychiatric diagnosis and CST abilities. In their review of the CST restoration literature,
Zapf and Roesch (2011) identified three salient factors common to non-restored
defendants: a diagnosis of mental retardation, older age, and a diagnosis of psychotic
disorder. These (and other) authors argue that a reliance on diagnostic classification and
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the oversimplification of competency as a construct precludes a more detailed
understanding of how specific symptoms impact competency related abilities (Jacobs,
Ryba, & Zapf, 2008; Zapf & Roesch, 2011). More specifically, Zapf and Roesch note,
“[I]nformation regarding specific symptoms and specific competency related
abilities…would be more useful” (p. 44). A more circumscribed focus on symptoms may
therefore offer more reliable data rather than targeting diagnostic categories. So, not only
have few studies focused on CST restoration (compared to initial CST findings), but
fewer still have investigated the role of specific symptoms on CST abilities and related
restoration outcomes. The current study aimed to contribute to this avenue of research.
Finally, while the use of medication to treat IST defendants remains
commonplace, questions regarding the suitability of such treatment and the rates at which
delusional defendants accept or refuse treatment are not well well understood.

Research Questions
The primary questions to be posed in the current study can be formulated as follow:
Q1:

What proportion of defendants with psychotic symptoms, remanded for
competency restoration, suffer with DD?

Q2:

What is the competency restoration rate for defendants with DD, absent other
psychotic and affective symptoms, after a single, statutorily determined (120 day)
period of treatment at the FMC?
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Q3:

Is there a difference in the rates of competency restoration between defendants
with DD (absent other psychotic and affective symptoms), and defendants with
other psychotic symptoms after a single CST restoration period/study period6.

Q4:

Is the average length of stay (LOS) for DD IST defendants different from that of
IST defendants with other psychotic symptoms for a preliminary 120 day
restoration period?

Q5:

Do the dimensional ratings of action and pervasiveness of delusions impact
restorability?

Q6:

Does impairment of specific competency related abilities differ for DD defendants
compared to defendants suffering other psychotic symptoms?

Q7:

What study variables are the best predictor of restorability?

6

The terms restoration period, study period, and period of evaluation and treatment are used
interchangeably throughout.
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Chapter Three
Method
This primary goal of the present study was to investigate the competency
restoration rates of IST defendants with DD and contrast this group with defendants who
exhibit other psychotic symptoms. More specifically, the study also identified how specific
psychotic symptoms impact competency related abilities. In this section, a methodological
account of the study is provided, including an overview of relevant ethical concerns.
Sample Demographics. The majority of the all-male defendants in the current
sample (N = 201) were either White (36%) or Hispanic (35%) followed by African
American (22%). The remainder of the sample included defendants of Asian (4), African
(3), Caribbean, Middle Eastern (3), and Native American (1) descent with an overall mean
age of 42.26 (SD = 10.71). The mean level of education for the 201 men in the sample was
9.72 years (SD = 3.26) and of the 158 with data on employment status 132 (83.5%) were
unemployed at the time of arrest. Data were also available on the employment history of
108 men and the occupational categories are listed in Table 3 below. Most men were not
married (55%) while the rest were either divorced or separated (35%), married (8%), or
widowed (2%). A total of 154 cases had data on prior convictions and/or arrests, and 79%
of defendants had a prior conviction and/or arrest. The proportion of violent prior offenses
for those defendants with a criminal history was 48%.
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Table 3
Defendant Employment Categories by History
Occupational Classification

n

%

Agricultural/Landscaping

14

13.0

Construction/Manual labor

30

27.8

Fast food/Counter work

16

14.8

Administrative/Clerical

14

13.0

Technical/Skilled labor

13

12.0

Professional

3

2.8

Mostly Unemployed

12

11.1

Otherᵃ

6

5.6

N = 201, ᵃSelf employed

In terms of current criminal charges the most common were illegal re-entry,
firearms, and substance related offenses. Index offenses for the defendants in the sample
are listed in Table 4. Nine defendants (4.5%) had an additional index offense in a
different category. The 11 index offenses listed under “Other” included crimes involving
arson, destruction of property, conspiracy, and conveying false information.
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Table 4
Current Index Offenses for CST Restoration Defendants
Index Offense

n (%)

Add. Index Offense (n)

Murder/Attempted Murder

4 (2.0)

Sex Offense

14 (7.0)

Assault

23 (11.4)

Firearms/Weapons

32 (15.9)

2

Robbery

9 (4.5)

2

Illegal Re-entry

46 (22.9)

Substance Related

27 (13.4)

Fraud

14 (7.0)

Threats to Injure/Kill

21 (10.4)

2

Other

11 (5.5)

2

1

N = 201

Procedure
The current study was approved by the Bureau of Prisons Research Review Board
(BRRB), which oversees institutional research at the Federal Medical Center (FMC) in
Butner. An archival review of cases remanded for competency restoration to FMC
(Butner) by the court pursuant to Title 18 USC §4241(d) were reviewed. The five (5) year
time period covered was from 2009-2013. The proceedings for section 4241 are
described in Appendix B. The forensic team responsible for the 4241(d) treatment and
evaluation reports include a primary evaluator, i.e., a staff psychologist or psychiatrist
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along with either psychiatric or psychological consultation respectively. Data and
feedback from correctional, medical, and mental health staff is also incorporated into the
competency restoration process. The forensic assessments data from these files included
clinical interviews, reviews of medicolegal and index offense data, observations by BOP
staff members, psychological testing, and other collateral data. All IST cases, including
those involving involuntary treatment were included
FMC Butner admission summary data indicates that the average annual number of
4241(d) referrals alone is close to 240 (Dr. Edward Landis, personal communication,
2015). Most defendants referred for restoration at the FMC are treated with psychotropic
medication. In addition, defendants are also have the opportunity to participate in a once
weekly Competency Restoration Class. Individual cognitive behavioral therapy is also
offered to defendants where appropriate. All forensic evaluations were completed by
licensed clinicians (psychologists and psychiatrists) within the inpatient FMC setting.
Federal statutes require that evaluations and treatment be completed within a period of
four months.
Preliminary Case Selection. Research on CST and particularly competency
restoration has shown that most defendants adjudicated IST suffer with psychotic
symptoms. A directory search was conducted of all 4241(d) or CST restoration cases for
the calendar years 2009 to 2013. Cases were identified by a BOP health systems
specialist using the following search terms: psychosis, psychotic, psychotic feature*,
delusions, paranoi*, schizo*, mood with, depression, and bipolar. Approximately 25% of
cases were sampled from each of the five calendar years spanning from 2009 to 2013.
Consecutive alphabetical cases were drawn from each year with alternate years running
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in reverse order (from the letter "Z" upwards). All cases were de-identified by the health
systems specialist prior to coding. After initial selection cases were coded for psycholegal
variables and symptoms were scored using the extended 24-item version of the Brief
Psychiatric Rating Scale/BPRS (Lukoff, Nuechterlein, & Ventura, 1986) and ultimately
divided into 3 subgroups based on BPRS scores. Cases were also coded for comorbid
cognitive disability/mental retardation and substance disorder. In order to detect a
medium effects size (ES=.15) for α=.05 and up to five predictors in the model Cohen
(1992) suggests a sample size of N≥182.
Exclusions. Adjudicative competence speaks to present ability; thus, it is a
dynamic construct that includes the potential for fluctuation in a defendant’s competency
related abilities. Therefore, to rule out multiple observations of any one defendant/case,
all cases where a defendant’s psychiatric condition deteriorated (for example, due to nonadherence to the prescribed medication) resulting in a return to the FMC were excluded.
In addition, all cases with a documented history of body dysmorphic disorder, paranoid
personality disorder, and obsessive compulsive disorder were excluded. Cases where
concerns about potential malingering were raised during and/or upon conclusion of the 4month restoration period were also excluded. Further exclusions were cases with a
documented and/or diagnosed cognitive disorder, and/or documented traumatic brain
injury (TBI), and/or dementia. Although specific psychiatric symptoms and subsequent
classification of DD were the focus of this study data on differential diagnosis was also
recorded at the end of the coding protocol in order to identify the aforementioned
exclusion categories. Clinicians used DSM-IV-TR for diagnostic coding for the time
period covered by the current study.
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Data Coding. Study data included socio-demographic, psycholegal, and
psychiatric symptom (BPRS) variables coded from the case files of pretrial defendants
remanded for CST restoration. Appendix A lists the key variables coded for the study. In
collaboration with administrative staff at the FMC relevant cases were identified and then
coded by the principal investigator (PI). Approximately 10% of the cases7 were randomly
selected to assess interrater reliability. To facilitate this process a staff psychologist (KB)
underwent training on the coding manual, which included instruction on the archival use
of the BPRS, and this rater (KB) has extensive experience with the data contained in the
forensic/4241(d) reports as well as the CST abilities outlined in the coding manual.

Interrater Reliability
Raters reviewed two reports in each cluster of twenty to identify coding problems
and disagreements. Percent agreements were calculated for all data points except for the
BPRS and dimensional ratings of delusions. Rater agreement was >97%, and discrepant
scoring was for a single item (date in custody), coded as missing by KB, but recorded
from collateral data by the principal investigator. Subsequent cases were revised
accordingly.
Weighted Kappa coefficients were calculated for the BPRS ratings. The following
weights were assigned for absolute differences in scoring on the expanded 24-item
BPRS: 1 = full agreement, partial agreement .75 = |1|, .50 = |2|, .25 = |3|, and no

7

A case refers to a study period and not a defendant who may (or may not) have had multiple court-ordered

studies for the same index offense.
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agreement 0 = |4|, as well as 0 = presence vs. absence and/or one rater ≥4 and the other
<4. Coding for the BPRS showed good interrater reliability with Kappa = .67. This
coefficient was somewhat lower than previous interrater reliability data for archival use
of the BPRS, however, the latter were interclass correlations (Adachi et al., 2000) based
on the sum of rater scores.
Simple Kappa coefficients were calculated for dimensional ratings of delusions,
and yielded substantial agreement, Kappa = .775, p < .05. The latter coefficient supports
the notion that the dimensional constructs of action and pervasiveness are amenable to
archival review.
Variables included in the structured coding protocol included both categorical and
continuous data, and where numeric values were not assigned data were entered as string.
Instances where variable information was incomplete/missing/unknown were recorded as
=99 (or -9 as applicable).
Outcomes regarding competency restoration were based on the conclusions of
forensic evaluators (rather than clinical ratings of recovery)8, and specific competency
related abilities that were impaired upon admission to the FMC were also coded. The
broad designations of rational and factual understanding, and ability to relate to defense
counsel as set out in Dusky can render the coding of CST abilities somewhat vague.
Skeem et al. (1998) identified 11 global psycholegal domains to address this shortcoming
in the coding structure of CST reports. The functional abilities identified by these authors
(see Table 5) help to elucidate the language captured in Dusky. Accordingly, CST

8

Previous reviews typically rated recovery on a continuum (Manschrek & Khan, 2006; Munro & Mok,
1995)
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abilities were coded as they appeared (string) within the initial CST evaluations. Finally,
for cases where a defendant was charged with multiple offenses only the most serious
charge was applied in subsequent analysis. Based on the judgments of forensic evaluators
cases were coded for restoration status (0=not restored and 1=restored) after a 120 day
period.
Table 5
Competency Domains*
Capacity to participate in trial
Capacity to testify relevantly
Capacity to understand the adversary nature of proceedings
Capacity to disclose relevant information to counsel
Basic knowledge of legal strategies and options
Relationship with counsel
Capacity for reasoned choice among options
Capacity for reasoned choice among options
Capacity to behave appropriately in court
Capacity to appreciate charges
Capacity to appreciate potential penalties
Medication effects on CST
* Listed by Skeem et al. (1998)
Dimensions of Delusions. Two variables from the MacArthur-Maudsley
Assessment of Delusions Schedule (Appelbaum et al., 1999), which provide a noncontent based, dimensional perspective of delusions were included in the coding manual.
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These are pervasiveness and action – the two dimensions most amenable to retrospective
analysis from the MacArthur study. Pervasiveness refers to the degree to which the
delusional belief penetrates into areas of the defendant’s life, and is scored on a four point
scale ranging from not at all to virtually all experiences as related to the delusional
conviction/ belief (range 0-3). Action refers to the extent to which the defendant’s index
offense was motivated by the delusional belief, and ranges from 0-5, i.e., no actions, to
nonaggressive actions only, aggressive thoughts, aggressive acts without injury to victim,
aggressive acts with unknown injury to victim, and finally to violence with injury or use
of weapons Using the MacArthur-Maudsley Delusions Assessment Schedule (a modified
version of the Maudsley Delusions Assessment Schedule), Appelbaum et al. (1999)
found support for a two-factor structure in a dimensional assessment of delusions. Data
from 328 psychiatric inpatients in the multisite MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment
Study revealed a two factor solution, which they labeled intensity/scope and affect/action
respectively. This solution showed consistency, independent of diagnosis, in a sample
where 71% of the delusional patients were schizophrenic and more than 10% suffered a
mood disorder, and accounted for more than two-thirds of the variance (Appelbaum et al.,
1999) in their model.
Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS). The 24-item BPRS (Expanded Version)
was developed to assess change in psychiatric symptoms over time within a treatment
context (Lukoff et al., 1986). Scores on the BPRS are rated on a 0 (not assessed) to 7
(extremely severe) scale, (see Appendix B adapted from Lukoff et al., 1986). The BPRS
has been widely used across a range of settings and application of the instrument is
relatively uncomplicated with investigators reporting excellent interrater reliability scores
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(Lachar et al., 2001). Factor analytic research using the expanded BPRS in forensic
settings has identified five subscales or symptom clusters: Psychoticism; Thought
Disorder; Depression; Mania; and Withdrawal (Jacobs, Ryba, & Zapf, 2008). Further,
CST research with the BPRS has shown that the Psychoticism cluster is most strongly
associated with IST findings (Jacobs et al., 2008). Although not ideal for retrospective
coding using the BPRS to empirically review archival data has been established in the
literature (Adachi et al., 2000; Mullins, Pfefferbaum, Schultz, & Overall, 1986).
First, all cases with documented psychotic symptoms upon admission to the FMC
pursuant to a remand for CST restoration were included for analysis. BPRS data were
coded from the admission data contained within the forensic reports. To minimize rater
bias, BPRS data was coded prior to extracting data on comorbidity in the differential
diagnosis section.
To be classified as DD relevant BPRS items, i.e., 1 (somatic concerns), 5 (guilt), 8
(grandiosity), and 9 (suspiciousness) were content coded to identify delusional disorder
cases. BPRS scoring requires that DD cases have a score of ≥6 on the aforementioned
items. In addition to identifying delusional content for items 1, 5, 8, and 9, DD case
classification required: ≤2 on any Psychoticism cluster items, ≤2 on item 12 (Thought
Disorder cluster), and ≤3 on any Depression, Mania and/or Withdrawal cluster item. The
decision chart for the different group (DD, schizophrenia, and mood disorder with
psychotic features) assignments is outlined in Figure 1. Consistent with BPRS coding
items were coded 'N/A" when relevant clinical data was not documented for the specified
period within the 4241(d) report.
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Figure 1
BPRS Classification of Three Clinical Groups

Restoration Cases Listing Psychotic Symptoms
(Exclude all Cognitive Impairment and Malingering cases)

Item score ≥4:
Conceptual Disorganization
Hallucination, Disorientation

Schizophrenia
spectrum

Item score ≥4:
Anxiety, Depression,
Motor hyperactivity,
Tension, Excitement

Mood with Psychosis

NO Item score ≥4:
Conceptual Disorganization
Hallucination, Disorientation

NO Item score ≥4:
Anxiety, Depression, Motor
hyperactivity, Tension,
Excitement

Item scores ≥6:
Somatic concerns, Guilt,
Grandiosity, Suspiciousness

Delusional Disorder
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Although the distinction between bizarre and nonbizarre delusions to differentiate
between DD and schizophrenia is no longer salient in the current diagnostic nosology this
distinction has been retained as a specifier in DSM-V. Accordingly, delusional content on
any of the DD items was coded as nonbizarre or bizarre, and items 5, 8, and 9 on BPRS
were reviewed to determine the bizarreness of the delusional content (if present).

Statistical Analysis. First, descriptive statistics for the study variables are reported
followed by independent samples t tests and nonparametric comparisons for different
groups. Logistic regression was utilized to determine the study variables predictive of
restoration outcomes (0=not restored; 1=restored). The preference for logistic regression
is based on its more flexible assumptions and types of data open to analysis. Logistic
regression also facilitates both categorical and continuous variables, the predictors do not
have to be normally distributed or have a linear relationship, and are not required to have
equal variance within each group (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Model predictors were
assessed for univariate outliers and multicollinearity, and goodness-of-fit tests together
with relevant model fit indices were reported. The Wald statistic was used to report the
significance of individual coefficients. Preference was accorded to those predictor
variables with an empirical basis in the determination of initial CST status and
restoration, as well as those variables with a significance level of α≤0.5 were retained in
the model assessment.
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Ethical Concerns and Data Protection. All identifying information about
defendants (or their alleged victims) was anonymized. Identifying data were removed
from the research database. No data from the FMC files was copied, and links to
identifiable data were retained at the FMC. These links were destroyed once study data
had been fully analyzed. Anonymized, coded data were stored in a secure facility at John
Jay College and all electronic documents related to the study were encrypted and
password protected. All data from this study will be destroyed in accordance with federal
law, American Psychological Association (APA) standards, and university (CUNY)
policies. The principal investigator completed training on the federally required Human
Subjects Protection Education Program/Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative
(CITI).
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Chapter Four
Results
This chapter provides descriptive statistics for psycholegal and clinical variables
followed by an examination of group means, and were applicable results from nonparametric analysis such as Chi-square tests of independence are presented. Finally,
logistic regression results are outlined for the criterion variable, i.e., CST status. All data
were analyzed using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), version 22.

Data Characteristics
The reports by forensic evaluators were comprehensive and structured to include
identifying data for the case, procedures administered, background information, and the
course of treatment and evaluation while at the FMC. A wide range of sources comprised
the collateral information reviewed in the forensic reports. An example, but by no means
an exhaustive list includes: data from the criminal complaint, prior CST evaluations,
transcripts from court proceedings, law enforcement reports, correspondence with the
Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) and defense counsel, interviews with family
members and previous treatment providers, and existing medical records.
Data on the defendants’ institutional progress was similarly detailed and included
a discrete mental status examination upon admission, clinical interviews and
observations, a physical examination along with admission laboratory tests, and relevant
clinical-forensic assessments.
These assessments included data from standardized measures such as the
Examination of Competency to Stand Trial - Revised (ECST-R), the MacArthur
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Competency Assessment Test - CA), and the Revised Competency Assessment
Instrument (R-CAI). Data from malingering and feigning instruments such the Test of
Memory Malingering (TOMM), Structured Interview of R Symptoms (SIRS), and the
Validity Profile Indicator (VPI) was included were indicated. Finally, numerous data
from cognitive, personality, and symptom profile measures were also included.
A total of 232 individual competency restoration cases pursuant to Title 18
Section 4241(d) were reviewed for the current study. Competency to stand trial once
restored is not an immutable state and consequently new 4241(d) referrals for the same
defendant are to be expected. Cases where defendants were transported from the FMC by
US Marshalls after completion of a treatment and evaluation period, and then
subsequently returned pursuant to Title 18 U.S.C. Section 4241(d) were excluded. These
subsequent forensic reports provided data on a second or later evaluation and treatment
periods, and were excluded regardless of the time difference between 4241(d)
designations. These cases were readily identifiable as prior court ordered four month
evaluation and treatment periods at the FMC were clearly outlined in the forensic reports.
For status reports, typically court ordered updates after every 30 days, the initial report
was coded and the final status report provided data on restoration outcomes. Once all readmissions were excluded N = 201 cases were available for analysis. Importantly, not all
data in the current study coded as ‘missing’ was absent, but rather absent only from the
4241(d) report as evaluators would routinely reference separate reports. Access to this
additional data was limited by the scope outlined in the BRRB research approval.
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Legal Variables
Offense History. In addition to the previously outlined index offense data
previous convictions and/or arrests and whether or not these past offenses were violent
were also coded. Data were available on 154 cases regarding prior offending and for 122
cases a determination could be made as to whether the offenses were violent or not.
Designation of a violent criminal past was limited to interpersonal contact offenses
involving aggressive acts. The overwhelming majority (79.2%) of defendants had a prior
record of arrest and/or conviction and in close to half (48.8%) of these cases the previous
offenses were of a violent nature.
Time Spent in Custody. A myriad of factors, some more foreseeable than others
(for example, the complexity of a case), add to time spent on pretrial proceedings. Data
was screened for outliers9 in order to determine the average time defendants spent in
custody prior to admission for CST restoration. The mean number of days defendants
spent in custody preceding admission for competency restoration was 289.7 (SD = 189.8)
days or approximately 9.5 months. When a defendant was charged while in a custodial
setting the date of that specific instant offense was recorded as the date in custody.
Arrests for violations of supervised release was recorded as date in custody, independent
of the arrest date for the original index offense.
Length of Stay/Admission (LOS). Upon conclusion of a court ordered
competency restoration period defendants are transferred back to the referring district by
US Marshalls. However, there are circumstances when a defendant may remain at the
FMC, for example, by court order or instances where their continued psychiatric stability

9

Using outlier labeling (Hoaglin, Iglewicz, & Tukey, 1986)
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may be compromised by a return to a county jail or other contract facility. The mean
length of stay (LOS) for a first study was 107.9 days (SD = 34) and there was no
significant difference between the LOS means for those defendants ultimately found
competent (M = 108.6, SD = 3.2) and those who were opined IST (M= 107.2, SD = 3.5)
by clinical evaluators.

CST Related Abilities
The forensic reports reviewed typically gave a brief course of the circumstances
and related clinical forensic evaluations leading up to the current FMC admission,
wherefrom impairments in CST abilities at the start of the competency restoration period
were coded. There were data referencing impairment in competency related ability
contained in the majority (92%, n = 185) of the reports/cases. However, most reports
(57.8%) stipulated a broad Dusky-based statement regarding a defendant's IST status
upon admission. In an additional 16.2% of cases a defendant’s ability to disclose relevant
information to counsel was highlighted followed by problems with their relationship with
counsel (5.9%), their ability to behave appropriately in court (4.9%), and their ability to
appreciate the charges against them (4.9%). For those cases where the defendant’s
relationship with counsel was mentioned “paranoia towards counsel” and “contempt for
counsel” were some of the phrases noted. Examples of defendants’ inability to disclose
relevant information were often mentioned in the context of a defendant’s disorganized
speech and/or interpersonal withdrawal. A lack of appreciation of charges typically
included references to a defendant’s insistence that they had not broken any law(s)
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regardless of their actual offense behavior/actions. All other frequencies for the 11
psycholegal domains listed by Skeem et al. (1998) were ≤5.
Given the limited number of cases across the 11 different domains no further
analysis between groups was conducted for CST abilities. However, the two variables,
ability to disclose relevant information to counsel and relationship with counsel were
combined to form a composite variable, i.e., interaction with counsel (n = 41). Only 1 in
every 3 cases where a defendant had a disrupted interaction with counsel was ultimately
opined restored after four months.

CLINICAL VARIABLES and DELUSIONS
Previous Psychiatric Treatment. There was information on prior hospitalization
and/or psychiatric treatment, excluding any custodial psychiatric treatment related to the
current index offense, for n = 185 cases. Approximately a third of all defendants (66.5%)
had a documented history of past psychiatric treatment.
Comorbid Conditions. Forty five percent of defendants were diagnosed with
either a post-study comorbid personality (n = 24), substance abuse/dependence (n = 63),
and/or cognitive disorder10 (n = 13). The latter group comprised seven cases of mental
retardation, four traumatic brain injury, and two cases of dementia. Most (70%) of the
defendants suffering with cognitive disorders were found unfit to proceed and only 1 in 5
was considered likely to be restorable by forensic evaluators.

10

Cases of mental retardation, cognitive impairment secondary to a medical condition or traumatic brain
injury were grouped together.
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The majority of defendants (68.2%) with a comorbid substance abuse/dependence
disorder had a history of abusing two or more substances. These were predominantly a
combination of alcohol, cannabis, cocaine, and/or methamphetamines. Approximately 1
in every 10 had a comorbid personality disorder and these included antisocial (n = 11),
narcissistic (n = 4), and borderline (n = 3) personality disorders. Nine cases had a
differential diagnosis of malingering or rule out thereof upon completion of the four
month study, and two thirds of these cases were opined restored by forensic evaluators.

Delusions and Clinical Subgroups
The principle source of data for the symptom profiles gleaned from the BPRS
were gathered from the initial clinical assessment of the defendant upon their arrival at
the FMC. The course of the initial evaluation comprises a clinical interview by the
primary forensic evaluator subsequent to the defendant's arrival at the Mental Health
Department of the FMC and this is followed by the forensic team's assessment once the
defendant is transferred to an appropriate unit. This clinical data often included dates of
interviews alongside relevant incidents and observations. The coding of relevant BPRS
data was limited to the mental status examination upon admission and these initial
evaluations of the CST restoration period.
A number of cases were excluded from subsequent analysis. Mental status data
for two cases were not independently outlined at intake, but interspersed with the rest of
the evaluation and treatment data, and were thus excluded from subsequent analysis. The
aforementioned cognitive disorder and malingering (including rule outs) cases, and cases
that did not reach the symptom cutoffs on the BPRS. The latter category included cases
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with minimal to no psychotic symptomatology as well as mood disturbances without
psychotic features.
Using BPRS cut scores a composite score for positive psychotic symptoms was
calculated from the following items: somatic concerns, guilt, grandiosity, suspiciousness,
unusual thought content, hallucinations, and conceptual disorganization. Based on this
score the proportion of defendants who met the cutoff for positive psychotic symptoms in
the sample was 79.6%. Overall, more than half (58%) of defendants experienced one or
more subtype(s) of delusions. Persecutory delusions (64.3%) were by far the most
prevalent delusional subtype followed by the grandiose (29.4%), somatic (5.4%), and one
case of erotomanic delusions respectively. Of the defendants who met the symptoms
threshold for psychosis 28.7% were classified as delusional, 38.9% schizophrenia
spectrum, and 21.2% mood with psychotic symptoms respectively. Together these three
groups comprised 70.1% (n = 141) of the entire sample.
Dimensional Rating of Delusions. Results for the continuous action and
pervasiveness variables showed that most offense behaviors for delusional defendants
were unrelated to the index offense (44%). For those cases where delusions were
connected to actions, i.e., the index offense, 22% involved aggressive acts without
injuries to others followed by 19% of nonaggressive actions and 15% of aggressive
actions resulting in injury and/or with the use of weapon. In terms of the pervasiveness of
delusional ideation most defendants (46%) had numerous areas of their daily lives
impacted as opposed to virtually all, not at all, or some areas of functioning.
A comparison of delusions and their dimensional ratings across all three clinical
subgroups is presented in Table 6. Approximately a third (30.9%) of defendants in the
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delusional subgroup had mixed delusions, and of these the predominant combination
(83.3%) was persecutory with concurrent grandiose delusions.
Table 6
Prevalence (%) of Delusions and Dimensional Ratings across Clinical Groupsᵃ
Delusional

Schizophrenia

Mood with Psychosis

Persecutory

89.1

40.0

65.7

Grandiose

39.1

26.6

20.0

Somatic

__

6.6

11.4

1.56 (1.06)*

1.00 (1.27)

.44 (0.75)*

1.45 (0.81)

1.22 (0.89)

Subtypeᵇ

Dimensional Rating
Actionᶜ

Pervasivenessᶜ 2.07 (0.69)**

ͣ Combined N = 141; ᵇ Proportion within group; ͨ Mean score (SD); p ≤ .05; p ≤ .005

The dimensional rating of action (dependent variable) showed a statistically
significant difference across the three groups, F(2, 101) = 9.44, p < .005. Post hoc Tukey
HSD contrasts indicated that the index offenses (actions leading up to arrest, M = 1.56,
SD = 1.06) of delusional defendants were more likely to be associated with their
delusional ideation compared to defendants suffering a mood disorder with psychosis (M
= 0.44, SD = 0.75), but not more likely when compared with defendants suffering
schizophrenia spectrum symptoms. As a dependent variable pervasiveness showed a
statistically significant difference across the three groups, F(2, 100) = 11.42, p < .005,
indicating that delusional defendants ( M = 2.07, SD = 0.69) were more likely than the
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other two groups [schizophrenic spectrum (M = 1.45, SD = 0.81), and mood with
psychosis, (M = 1.22, SD = 0.89)] to have a greater proportion of their daily lives
impacted by delusional beliefs. Examples of the delusional content contributing to the
higher scores on dimensional ratings for those in the delusional subgroup included cases
of illegal re-entry compelled by the erroneous nonbizarre belief of being on a secret
governmental mission, and a case where a defendant makes a border crossing without any
effort to evade detection in the (false) hope of pursuing a love interest with a high ranking
BOP official whom he met during a prior period of incarceration.
Subgroups and Study Variables. Table 7 provides a comparison of the three
groups in terms of key study variables. There were significant differences for age and
clinical group, F(2, 140) = 3.93, p ≤ 0.05, and for education and clinical group F(2, 105)
= 20.58, p ≤ .005.Tukey HSD post hoc contrasts indicated that delusional defendants
were older (M = 45.85, SD = 9.95) compared to those in the schizophrenia spectrum (M
= 40.94, SD = 10.56) and mood with psychosis (M = 40.51, SD = 9.53) subgroups. In
terms of education, those in the schizophrenia spectrum subgroup had completed fewer
years of formal education (M = 7.74, SD = 3.22) than either of those in the other two
subgroups. Both effect sizes for age and education were, however, very small (≤ .07).
Further, analysis showed a statistically significant difference for ethnicity and
clinical subgroup membership, χ2 (4, N = 134) = 3.55, p < .005. Defendants in the
delusional subgroup were more likely to be Caucasian rather than African American or
Hispanic. However, Caucasian ethnicity accounted for only a small part of group
designation, phi (φ) = .163.
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Table 7
Mean Comparisons of Three Clinical Groups
Group

Delusional

Schizophrenia

Mood w/ Psychosis

CI (upper, lower)

Age

45.85(9.95)*

40.94 (10.56)

40.51 (9.53)

40.71, 44.12

Education

11.54 (2.26)

7.74 (3.22)**

10.10 (2.19)

9.08, 10.27

African American

20.9 (9)

26.3 (15)

26.5 (9)

Hispanic

16.3 (7)

49.1 (28)

35.3 (12)

Caucasian

62.8 (27)**

24.6 (14)

38.2 (13)

Custody to Admission

289.66 (208.67)

254.93 (155.57)

321.48 (183.75)

251.17, 313.54

LOS

107.20 (33.09)

117.48 (30.95)

110.94 (30.57)

107.34, 117.81

Prior Arrest/Convictionᵃ

28.9 (26)

43.3 (39)

27.8 (25)

89.1 (41)**

31.3 (26)

19.3 (16)

Demographic

Ethnicityᵃᵇ

Legal Variables

Treatment Refusalᵃ

ͣ Proportion % (n); ᵇn = 11 “Other” (dispersed across 5 different ethnic categories) were excluded; *p≤0.05, **p≤0.005, n = 141

67

Treatment
Psychotropic Treatment. The FMC formulary for antipsychotic medications
comprises a wide range of both atypical and first generation agents, including newer
medications such olanzapine, ziprazsdone, risperidone, quetiapine, aripirazole, and older
first-generation antipsychotics such as haloperidol, fluphenazine, and perphenazine (Dr.
Bryon Herbel, personal communication, 2015). At least 59.2% (n = 119) of defendants
started a trial of antipsychotic medication (not including those treated with
antidepressants, mood stabilizers, and antianxiety medications only), and 47.8% (n = 96)
had at least one adequate antipsychotic drug trial within the single study period. Most
defendants, around two thirds (67.2%), were treated with newer, atypical agents and there
was no statistically significant difference (p = .706) for competency status (opined CST
or IST) and type of antipsychotic agent (typical vs. atypical) after a 4-month treatment
period.
Non-pharmacological Intervention. Data on CST group attendance or refusal
was available for 116 cases and of these about 42% of defendants participated in the once
weekly didactic group. The group is open-ended, runs on a seven week cycle, and
includes an overview of the legal system, identifying and explaining the roles of court
principals, the role of the defendant, working with counsel, basic legal vocabulary, and
the trial process.
Treatment Refusal. More than half (52%) of the defendants in the current sample
refused treatment with antipsychotic medication at some point during their initial 120 day
CST restoration admission. This group of treatment refusers included outright refusals
upon admission as well as those who would intermittently refuse, but later voluntarily

68

consent to treatment. Defendants have the right to and do refuse antipsychotic medication
at any time during their competency restoration, and clinical presentations varied with
corresponding periods of non-compliance and treatment refusal. Such disruptions in
treatment did not necessarily prompt changes in the drug type administered, but were
sometimes followed by renewed compliance and/or changes in the method of delivery.
The majority of outright refusers were in the delusional subgroup (see Table 7).
Treatment refusal showed a statistically significant difference across the three
subgroups, χ2 (2, n = 143) = 27.044, p < .005. Delusional defendants refused treatment at
some point during their 4-month CST restoration at higher rates compared to defendants
in the schizophrenia spectrum and mood with psychosis subgroups. Only five of the
forty-six DD defendants consented to treatment. Still, treatment refusal accounted for
only a small part, phi (φ) = .189, of group membership.

Involuntary Medication and Sell Requests.
Prior to a request for involuntary treatment pursuant to Sell Due Process hearings
under Harper, as required by the 5th United States Circuit Court, are conducted. Only
seven (7) defendants were involuntarily medicated pursuant to Harper. These included
instances where behavior stemming from treatment refusal or non-compliance with
antipsychotic medication were a direct casual factor in the exacerbation of an existing
medical condition; as well as cases where defendants exhibited persistent agitation
rendering them a danger to themselves and/or those around them.
Involuntary medication can of course be administered on an emergent basis under
circumstances of acute distress or to manage medical conditions associated with

69

substantial morbidity. However, when a defendant's mental illness does not preclude an
ability to attend to his basic human needs of health and safety, i.e., falls short of the
criteria for involuntary medication under the BOP administrative (Harper) guidelines 28
CRF 549 Section 43(a)(5) and 43(b), as determined by a hearing officer, the treatment
team will petition the court for judicial oversight to permit the involuntary administration
of psychotropic medication (if of course there is a likelihood of restoration) under Sell.
Forensic examiners submitted a total of 61 Sell requests for the 109 cases opined IST
after an initial four month treatment period, and the greater proportion 52.4% (n = 32) of
these was for defendants in the delusional subgroup compared to the schizophrenia
spectrum (26.2%) and mood with psychosis (13.1%) subgroups. Further follow up of
these Sell requests revealed that 36.1% (n = 22) petitions were granted and 11.5% (n = 7)
were denied, and for the majority of cases (52.5%, n = 32) the petition was left
unaddressed by the court. Three cases in the latter category involved subsequent
voluntary consent after the Sell submissions to the court while the rest (n = 29) were
subsequently subject to an assessment of dangerousness pursuant to Title 18 USC §4246.

CST Restoration Outcomes
The number of defendants opined fit to proceed after a single, statutorily
determined four (4) month restoration period was 46% (n = 91). In one case the CST
opinion was left undetermined and two (2) other cases involved evaluations of
competency other than to proceed to trial, i.e., competency to be sentenced and
competency to understand the conditions of supervised release. Tables 8 provides data on
differences between those restored and those opined not restored.
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Rates of competency restoration and the receipt of treatment were statistically
significant, χ2 (1, n = 200) = 43.93, p < .005, phi (φ) = .469, showing that those treated
with antipsychotic medication were much more likely to be opined restored at the end of
the 4-month study. The proportion of defendants who underwent at least one
therapeutically adequate trial of antipsychotic medication and were restored was 73.6%
while the proportion of those not treated but restored was 26.4%. Comparably, 26.6% of
defendants treated were found IST at the end of the 4-month study whereas 73.4% of
those who went untreated were opined unfit to proceed.

Likelihood of Restorability. Federal statutes (as with most state statutes) require
that forensic evaluators proffer an opinion regarding the likelihood of CST restoration,
i.e., the substantial probability that a defendant will attain the capacity to proceed to trial
in the foreseeable future given a period of evaluation and treatment. Such cases included,
for example, instances where defendants evidenced slow but steady symptom relief
pointing to a substantial likelihood of restoration in the foreseeable future given ongoing
treatment. Under these types of circumstance, absent outright treatment refusal, forensic
evaluators petitioned the court for an additional four months of treatment under Section
4241(d) of Title 18. For the vast majority of cases in the current study forensic evaluators
opined that a defendant would likely be restored with ongoing and/or involuntary
treatment. However, approximately 17% of defendants opined not restored after a single
study were considered not likely to be restored by forensic examiners.
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Restored and Non-Restored Defendants. There were no significant differences
between restored and non-restored defendants on any of the demographic variables of age
and education (see Table 8). Length of stay in the FMC was also not significantly
different for the two groups. One legal variables, time in custody prior to admission,
revealed that pretrial detainees who spent a longer time in custody before admission for
CST restoration were more likely to be opined restored at the end of their initial 120 day
study, t(180) = 2.722, p = .007. However, the variances between the two groups was
significantly different from each other, p = 0.04 on Levene’s test, thus negating the
results of the t-test.
One clinical variable showed a statistically significant difference between restored
and non-restored defendants, i.e., past psychiatric treatment and/or hospitalization, χ2 (1,
n = 184) = 4.164, p = .041, phi (φ) = .150. Defendants who were opined restored after the
120 day restoration period were less likely to have received past psychiatric treatment
and/or hospitalization, precluding treatment related to the current index offense. Finally,
the only other clinical variable approaching statistical significance at p ≤ .05 was
comorbidity (p = .084) suggesting that those without a comorbid condition were more
less likely to be opined restored. However, comorbidity was treated as a dichotomous
variable and no individual diagnostic categories were examined in the subsequent
analysis.
Finally, most of the DD defendants were opined restored after the 120 day
treatment period. However, the vast majority within this clinical subgroup refused
treatment at some point during the course of their admission; consequently foregoing an
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adequate treatment trial. Notably, only five DD defendants were voluntarily treated and
of these three (60%) were restored within the statutory timeframe.
The proportion of pretrial defendants within the schizophrenia and mood disorder
with psychosis subgroups who did not refuse treatment and were restored after the 4month treatment period were 56% and 79% respectively. The preponderance of treatment
refusal within the DD subgroup precludes any conclusions about the overall restorability
of this group as well as any comparison of CST restoration rates across clinical
subgroups.
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Table 8
Study Variables and Competency Restoration Outcomes
Variable Group

CST % (n)

IST % (n)

p

41.05 (11.02)

43.40 (10.34)

.12

CI

Demographic
Ageͣ
Ethnicity

-.64,5.32

.53

African American

12.4 (23)

10.8 (20)

Hispanic

16.1 (30)

21.5 (40)

17.7 (33)

21.5 (40)

9.80 (3.17)

9.63 (3.38)

Caucasian
Educationͣ
Relationship Status

.74

-1.24, .88

.27

Unmarried

23.7 (36)

30.3 (46)

Married

5.9 (9)

3.3 (5)

Divorced

6.6 (10)

14.5 (22)

Separated

7.2 (11)

6.6 (10)

Legal Variables
Custody to FMC Admissionͣ

332.39 (204.31) 256.76 (170.51)

.00**

-130.45,
-20.81

LOSͣ

108.60 (31.21)

107.21 (36.55)

.77

Prior Arrest/Conviction

78.3 (54)

79.8 (67)

.82

Violent Past Offense

51.8 (28)

46.3 (31)

.54

Comorbid Disorder

51.6 (47)

39.4% (43)

.08

Prior Tx/Hosp.

73.3 (74)

59.0 (49)

.04*

-10.97, 8.19

Clinical Variables

ͣ Represents mean values (SD), *p ≤ .05; **p = 0.007
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Logistic regression analysis
To assess CST restoration status after a single (primary) study period those
variables that reached significance in the preceding analysis of mean differences across
groups were entered into the logistic regression. In all four variables comprised the
logistic regression. The demographic variables of age and ethnicity were entered into the
model given their statistical significance in prior research (Mossman, 2007; Rodenhauser
& Khamis, 1988). In addition, the one clinical variable, i.e., comorbidity that approached
statistical significance in the preceding analysis was also retained as a predictor along
with one static predictor, i.e., prior treatment and/or hospitalization. Taken together, the
variables in the model were age, ethnicity, comorbidity, and previous psychiatric
treatment and/or hospitalization. Given the significant number of DD defendants who
refused treatment in the current study clinical group could not be meaningfully applied as
a predictor of competency restoration outcomes. Also, the legal variables of offense type
and past criminal history were not included given the equivocal findings about their
contributory value in previous empirical studies. Neither of the latter two variables
reached statistical significance in this study..
Predictors were entered into the model in a single step and a test of the full model
was statistically significant χ2(5, N = 172) = 10.802, p = .05 with a -2 Log Likelihood =
226.80. The model had an overall successful classification of 63.4%, and was able to
classify 50.0% of those that were restored correctly and 75.0% of those opined IST.
Finally, an examination of the exponentiated values revealed that those
defendants who had a history of past psychiatric treatment and/or hospitalization
(excluding treatment while in custody for the current index offense) were more than
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twice as likely, 2.05 (CI 1.02, 4.11), p = .044, to be opined unfit to proceed after the end
of the primary (120 day) study period.
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Table 9
Logistic Regression Results for Competency Status after an Initial 120 Day Restoration Period¹
B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Predictor
Age

-.024

.015

Ethnicity²

2.36

1

.124

1.587

2

.452

95% C.I. EXP(B)
Lower

Upper

.977

.948

1.006

Prior Psychiatric Treatment²

.718

.3564

4.075

1

.044*

2.050

1.021

4.116

Comorbidity

-.383

.321

1.425

1

.233

.682

.363

1.279

N = 172 (included in the analysis); Nagelkerke R = .081
¹ Not Restored = 0; Restored = 1
² Includes only African-American, Hispanic, and Caucasian
³ Excludes any custodial psychiatric treatment for index offense
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Chapter Five
Discussion
By some estimates, at any given time close to 10% of all the psychiatric beds
across the entire United States are occupied by pretrial detainees referred for competency
restoration (Mossman, 2007); a fact that should lend impetus for more research in this
area. To date broader research on adjudicative competence has primarily focused on
psychiatric diagnosis and psycholegal abilities after preliminary CST findings while data
on CST restoration has been minimal. As a result existing knowledge about factors that
predict successful restoration is not as robust as data on factors salient to initial
competency status. The current study examined the restoration rates of delusional
defendants after a single 4-months period of competency restoration and how this group
of pretrial detainees compare to those with different psychotic symptoms.

Prevalence of Delusional Ideation and Salient Demographic Variables
Approximately 28% of the current sample had delusional ideation in the absence
of other significant symptoms of psychopathology. However, it is important to stress that
this number does not represent the prevalence of delusional disorder among defendants
referred for CST restoration, but can be in part considered an artifact of case selection.
Notwithstanding, coding consistent with current nosological understanding
(DSM-V, 2013) of delusional disorder suggests the inclusion of those cases with a single
bizarre delusion, in the absence of hallucinations, disorganization, negative symptoms,
affective disturbance, and psychomotor abnormality, would increase the overall number
of cases in the DD group.
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Establishing sound prevalence rates for delusions is difficult, not only because
populations differ (psychiatric vs. forensic), but also due to variability in the assessment
methods across studies. Nonetheless, the presence of delusional thought content across
the entire sample of defendants does indicate that their occurrence is by no means
uncommon. The current study is not only consistent with previous research highlighting
the preponderance of persecutory content in delusional ideation (Herbel & Stelmach,
2007; Stompe et al., 1999), but also consistent with empirical studies showing the ratio
between the two most common types of delusion, i.e., persecutory and grandiose
delusions (Appelbaum, 1999).
A comparison of group means across demographic variables yielded two notable
results. First, DD defendants were older than those in the other two subgroups. This finding
appears consistent with existing perspectives about patients with delusional disorder going
undetected within the public health system for longer periods compared their counterparts
who suffer with other psychotic disturbances. That is of course until they have a run-in
with the criminal justice system (Felthous et al., 2001).
The other result of note was the lower number of years spent in formal education
by those defendants suffering with schizophrenia. Whereas the functional impairment
associated with delusional disorder may be more circumscribed thereby resulting in less
functional impairment within the community this results does suggest more pervasive
dysfunction for those living with schizophrenia. Also, although this study did not
investigate premorbid functioning meta-analytic data reporting prodromal cognitive
deficits during adolescence for those subsequently diagnosed with schizophrenia has been
documented (see for example Dickson, Laurens, Cullen, & Hodgins, 2012).
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Delusional Preoccupation and Offense Behavior
As with prior research findings those defendants with persecutory ideation were
more likely to have a stronger association between their delusions and pre-arrest
behaviors. Previous studies have shown that persecutory delusions tend to have higher
scores for action (as well as negative affect, a construct not investigated in this study),
and this appears consistent with the present results given the predominance of delusional
ideation for those in the DD group (Appelbaum et al., 1999).
Defendants in the DD group had higher action scores suggesting a greater
association between their pre-arrest behavior and their concomitant delusional thinking.
Notably, the current study designated threats to harm and/or kill as aggressive behaviors
regardless of whether defendants actually acted on such threats. Again, those in the DD
group were overrepresented in this offense category.
Previous studies have demonstrated that unlike schizophrenia and hallucinations
on their own, delusions can have an independent association with violence (Swanson,
Borum, Swartz, Monahan, 1996), and even more specifically, point to a link between
persecutory delusions and violent conduct (Coid, Ullrich, Kallis, Keers, Barker et al.,
2013). Although the current findings do not speak to DD defendants’ propensity or
motivation for violence the results do posit a link between aggressive offense behavior
and delusional ideation. However, scholars in the area do point out that this relationship
is complex and that delusions, along with underlying affective states such as anger,
probably play a strong mediational role between violence and active psychosis (Coid et
al., 2013; Junginger, 2006; Freeman, Garety, & Kuipers, 2001).
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DD defendants also scored higher on ratings of pervasiveness suggesting their
delusional convictions extend into a greater number of areas in their daily lives, but not
necessarily legal problems. In fact some scholars contend that these individuals only tend
to present for treatment after some confrontation with law enforcement (Felthous et al.,
2001), and the fact that the mean age of the DD group was older than both the
schizophrenia spectrum and mood with psychosis subgroup is in line with such a view.
Overall, the dimensional ratings of delusions yielded results in the expected
directions. The delusional ideation of those in the DD group was more closely associated
to their index offense and more prominent in their day to day lives compared with those
in the schizophrenia spectrum and mood with psychosis group.

Competency Related Abilities and DD Defendants
Most competency related impairment upon admission were documented in some
variant of Dusky. Even though there was not a sufficient amount of competency domains
separately delineated to permit detailed analysis there were a number of cases
documenting more specific psycholegal impairment. These cases were mostly in
reference to a defendant’s ability to disclose information to counsel or to relate to
counsel. The composite variable formed from the two preceding domains suggested that
DD defendants were more likely to have a disturbed interaction with counsel. Numerous
scholars have pointed out how delusional convictions are often a harbinger for
impairments in decisional capacity, and how subsequent efforts to counsel and/or
medicate are subsumed under entrenched delusional beliefs (Felthous et al., 2001;
Golding, 1995). Delusional convictions may impact a defendant's reasoning and actions
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across a range of competency domains, however, the broad designations upon admission,
of rational and factual understanding, and ability to relate to defense counsel as set out in
Dusky, limited additional analysis CST domains.

LOS and Treatment Refusal
Time in Treatment. Length of stay for this study was defined as the first,
uninterrupted 120 day competency restoration period. The fact that there was no
significant difference between IST and CST defendants on this particular variable can be
attributable to a number of factors. First, constraints on time and resources requires the
process of competency restoration to be focused in order to maximize the likelihood of
returning a defendant to court. Some studies suggests that most defendants are returned
within six months and others in 90 days. The overall LOS, time from admission to CST
restoration opinion, for the entire sample was not different for those opined restored
compared to those found IST after 120 day study.
There is no singular determinative factor in competency restoration, and
unsurprisingly the complexity of the process suggests that forensic evaluators will tend to
maximize treatment options and calibrate interventions accordingly. All this takes time.
As a result the minimal difference in the LOS for those opined restored and those who
remained IST after an initial 120 day restoration period is to be expected.
As a variable LOS in the context of competency restoration is complicated, more
especially for those defendants who are opined IST after a study. While in the custody of
the AUSA these defendants are typically not remanded at the same facility once they
conclude their statutorily determined 4-month treatment period. Even though there may
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be exceptions, for example when there are foreseeable risks associated with transporting
an inmate back to a county jail, most defendants leave the FMC to potentially return later
depending on their psychiatric wellbeing and pretrial proceedings. The extraneous
confounds resulting from such transfers, e.g., continued psychiatric treatment or the
disruption/lack thereof, outside the FMC complicates any interpretation of ‘time to
restoration’. Also, the rates of treatment refusal for the current sample and how this
behavior impacts time spent at the FMC cannot be discounted.
Treatment Refusal. Treatment with psychotropic medication is the principal
component in successful competency restoration, and not surprisingly, most defendants
(approximately three quarters) who completed at least one full trial of antipsychotic
medication were opined restored, regardless of the type (older vs. atypical) of
antipsychotic agent administered. On the opposite end, refusal of such treatment is
strongly associated with nonrestoration, albeit that a few scholars have reported some
counterintuitive findings (Rodenhauser & Khamis, 1988). Consistent with the majority of
existing studies treatment refusal showed a statistically significant association with IST
findings by forensic evaluators. Given such high rates of treatment refusal and
concomitant disruptions in the competency restoration process it is not surprising that
forensic evaluators routinely recommend ongoing involuntary medication for the
remainder of a defendant's pretrial and trial proceedings subsequent to a Sell request.
In this study defendants gave a multitude of reasons for medication refusal
ranging from the overtly psychotic (“you want to neutralize my blood”), to sarcasm (“you
restore furniture, not people”), to symptomatic denial (“ain’t shit wrong with me”), and to
the seemingly rational (“I don’t like the way it makes me feel”). This study further
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demonstrates how complicated the competency restoration process can be since pretrial
detainees who are psychotic retain the constitutional right to refuse forcible medication
absent grave disability and/or dangerous behavior.

Psychotic Symptoms and Competency Restoration Outcomes
Past research has been equivocal on the factors salient to competency restoration.
The greater proportion of the defendants in this study were not restored within a single 4month treatment period, and the overall competency restoration rate in the current study
was lower than that observed in previous research. A number of factors contribute to this
finding. First, most defendants in the current sample were suffering with severe psychotic
symptoms, and cases were selected on the basis of psychotic illness. In addition, the high
rate of treatment refusal in the current study was strongly associated with findings of IST
after a 120 day period of evaluation and treatment. However, the CST restoration rates
for defendants who underwent at least one therapeutically adequate trial of antipsychotic
medication was comparable with data reported in the extant literature, i.e., close to 75%
of treated defendants are ultimately found fit to proceed.
This study utilized BPRS symptoms to group defendants in terms of their
psychosis profile and exam CST restoration rates thereby adding to the growing body of
research focusing on symptom presentation rather diagnostic classification. The current
research makes inroads into some of the nine domains identified by Skeem et al (1998),
specifically, delusions, hallucinations, thought disorder, impaired reasoning, and mood
impairment. Identifying these deficits in delusional defendants adds to existing
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knowledge about the treatability and restorability, albeit for a single initial restoration
period, of this group of pretrial detainees.
The significant association between psychiatric drug administration and CST
restoration has been well documented. Even though most DD defendants were opined
unfit to proceed after the four month treatment period any comparisons of clinical groups
with regard to restoration outcomes is potentially confounding given the preponderance
of outright refusers in the DD subgroup. The current data contributes to our
understanding of how a delusional defendant without significant thought or mood
disturbance engages with treatment in a clinical-forensic setting, but any comparison with
other clinical subgroups in terms of CST restoration is restricted..
Unlike the current study the empirical investigations by Herbel and Stelmach
(2007) and later by Cochrane et al. (2012) regarding delusional defendants and
restorability both report data on involuntarily treated DD defendants. Both these studies
reported comparable CST restoration outcomes of around 75% for pretrial defendants
who underwent adequate (forcible) medication trials. In this study the number of cases in
the DD group who were voluntarily treated and restored was rather small to warrant any
meaningful comparison with the two other clinical groups.
Consistent with previous findings (Wolber, 2008; Mossman, 2007; Anderson &
Hewitt, 2002; Rodenhauser & Khamis, 1998) a history of prior psychiatric treatment was
associated with findings of incompetence. This could point to the severity and chronicty
of psychotic illness in those defendants found IST. Although this study did not assess the
chronicity of psychotic illness the presence of this static variable does appear to be
inversely related to positive CST outcomes.
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As expected, DD defendants in the current sample also accounted for the bulk of
the Sell requests submitted by evaluators. This study did not examine treatment outcomes
subsequent to forcible medication. Consequently, the question of the restorability of DD
defendants is not one that can be adequately answered by the current data. A number of
factors determine whether or not a defendant who refuses treatment is medicated at some
point during pretrial proceedings. For example, a seemingly more straightforward
outcome is voluntary consent after initial refusal while at the other end of the spectrum a
Sell request may be necessitated. Again, DD defendants outnumbered other pretrial
detainees in terms Sell requests submitted to the court.
Although most defendants in the current study were not restored within the first
120 days of treatment more than 80% were opined restorable given ongoing or
involuntary medication. Research suggest that forensic evaluators, consider factors
associated with more favorable prognosis such as: a limited psychiatric history, good
premorbid functioning, an absence of any comorbid disorders, and predominantly
positive symptoms. Those cases where defendants were opined non-restorable included
defendants who had at least three therapeutically adequate trials without clinically
observable abatement in their psychiatric symptoms. Also, there were cases of defendants
who became less combative after an adequate medication trial, but without much change
in the intensity of their delusional ideation.
The threshold for involuntary medication as per Harper is quite high, and this
conclusion is in part borne out in the small number of defendants (7) medicated pursuant
to Harper, even in the face of such high rates of treatment refusal. However, the
significant conceptual disorganization and/or intense agitation characteristic of the
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behaviors of defendants who are medicated pursuant to Harper is inconsistent with a
presentation of delusional disorder.

Limitations and Strengths
The present study is subject to a number of confounds and limitations common to
archival data reviews. First, the clinical data coded with the BPRS was from clinicians'
evaluations of defendants. However, existing research has demonstrated a relatively good
rate of agreement (up to 75%) between forensic examiners about the presence of different
psychiatric symptoms (Skeem et al., 1998), and the current research distinctly focused on
symptoms rather than psychiatric diagnosis. In addition, there is empirical data reporting
the use of the BPRS in archival research with good attendant estimates of interrater
reliability (Adachi et al., 2000; Mullins et al., 1986).
Extensive data exists on the utilization of diagnostic categories and CST
outcomes, and most studies point to the role of psychotic disorders and findings of IST.
Zapf and Roesch (2011) have rightly argued that the oversimplification of the CST and
overreliance on diagnostic categories limits more nuanced understanding. In an earlier
work these same authors also point out that the base rate for competency restoration is
high thereby according greater heuristic value to the identification of those cases with an
equivocal or poor response to treatment (Zapf & Roesch, 2009). Unfortunately the high
rates of treatment refusal by DD defendants in the current study limits any statistical
comparison of CST restoration outcomes for different symptom profiles.
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Also, examiner opinions served as a proxy for CST outcomes, but as past research
has documented, agreement between examiners and judges about CST status is
sufficiently high (Skeem, 1998).
Thirdly, this study examined data from a single federal institution within the Fifth
Circuit, and the expected variability in 4241 (d) referrals and resultant outcomes across
different federal jurisdictions may thus further limit the generalizability of the current
findings.
The current study also has a number of strengths. First, it adds to the body of
knowledge about a relatively understudied pretrial legal process. Given the resource
intensive nature of competency restoration this study contributes to a more nuanced
understanding of the restoration process thereby helping to focus treatment efforts in the
context of variable symptom profiles.
More specifically, the widespread prevalence of delusional content across
psychotic disorders is well documented. Insight as to how delusions, independent of other
psychotic symptoms, present in the psycholegal context holds potentially important data
for treatment planning when presented with delusional ideation in the absence of any
other significant psychotic or affective disturbances. CBT, albeit in studies with rather
small samples, has been shown to attenuate the convictions and actions associated with
delusional beliefs as well as reduce the affective intensity with which such beliefs are
held (O’Connor, 2007). However, securing the willingness of a pretrial defendant to
participate in such (alternative) treatment would no doubt be challenging.
Finally, there is a paucity of data on treatment refusal rates for IST defendants
undergoing restoration. This study provided data on a number of factors that have been
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hitherto overlooked in the extant literature. Data from the current research suggests that
these rates can be quite high, especially for defendants suffering with delusional ideation.
Such treatment refusal included determined, outright rejection of antipsychotic
medication upon admission as well as subsequent refusal once a course of treatment had
been initiated. On the one hand these findings yield the anticipated results, i.e., a
decreased probability of restoration for those left untreated with antipsychotic
medication, but on the other hand they also open a window of insight into the type of
pretrial detainee likely to refuse treatment.

Future Directions
As the body of research on competency restoration expands attention can turn
even more closely to salient outcome variables. When the constitutional right of a
defendant to refuse intrusive forcible medication is overridden the underlying processes
driving such decisions require close investigation. The work by Herbal and Stelmach
(2007) and Cochrane et al. (2012) provides valuable insight about the restorability of
delusional pretrial defendants. One implication from the rates of treatment refusal in the
current study means these results are not a direct extension of the aforementioned
authors’ work. Therefore, future studies can examine the data on Sell requests for
delusional defendants using larger sample sizes, and moreover, the circumstances
resulting in the denial or granting of Sell require more rigorous investigation, including
those cases when Sell requests are altogether deferred by the court and ‘superseded’ by an
order for custodial examination of dangerousness under Title 18 USC §4246.
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In addition, the role of possible mediators in treatment responses requires closer
scrutiny. To start, data on treatment refusal among pretrial detainees is sparse, and to
regard refusal by delusional pretrial detainees as mere recalcitrance, likening them to
their counterparts in the community, is somewhat simplistic. The extent to which their
false beliefs are related to an index offense, concomitant anger, and whether they suffer
mixed (more than one subtype) delusional ideas could all potentially mediate responses to
treatment in the forensic setting.
Later research, using actual adjudicated competence after a period of restoration,
needs to continue building on available data regarding the efficacy of different
antipsychotic drugs, particularly for delusional defendants who undergo adequate,
presumably involuntary (given high rates of symptomatic treatment refusal) medication
trials.
Although no single study could cover the breadth of variables (and limit all
confounds) associated with CST restoration future research would do well to track
pretrial detainees who refuse treatment more comprehensively. This in turn would require
IRB approval commensurate with the scope of such an undertaking.
As more standardized CST restoration protocols are developed across
jurisdictions treatment can be matched more accurately to specific symptoms. Shifting a
defendant’s psycholegal state to where they can return to court in a reasonable time to
confront their legal predicament is central to the process of competency restoration. Facts
pertinent to each case for DD defendants will continue to determine respective outcomes,
however, as our understanding about the efficacy of treatments for this group evolves
those elements less relevant to successful outcomes should fall by the wayside.
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Conclusion
Consistent with previous empirical findings the single variable identified in the
current study to be most predictive of non-restoration was a history of prior psychiatric
treatment and/or hospitalization. The current study and future research can help address
the relative dearth of data for both CST restoration and the impact of delusional ideation
within the forensic context. Alongside advances in psychotropic treatments restoration
outcome studies can offer a more coherent and comprehensive data profile to the courts.
The body of research on competency restoration will no doubt continue to grow and
therewith our insight into the complexity of this clinical-forensic nexus.
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Appendix A
Coding Structure
1. Study Case #: ______________
2. Age at time of admission to FMC: ______________
3. Race/Ethnicity: ______________________________
4. Current employment: Yes/No / Employment by history ______________
5. Education (yrs.)._______/Relationship status:_______
6. Prior Conviction: Yes/No

Violent/Non-V.

7. Original index offense (adapted from Cochrane et al., 2012):
1=Murder/Attempted Murder
2=Sex Offense
3=Assault
4=Firearm(s)
5=Robbery/Burglary
6=Illegal Re-entry
7=Substance related
8=Fraud/Commercial
9=Other: (specify) ______________________________
8. Date first in custody for current charge: _____________________
9. Admission date to FMC: ____________________
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10. Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS)
Symptom

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. Somatic concern

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Somatic delusion
2. Anxiety

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

3. Depression

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

4. Suicidality

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

5. Guilt

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Guilt

N/A

Bizarre

Nonbizarre

6. Hostility

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

7. Elated mood

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8. Grandiosity

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

N/A
Grandiosity
9. Suspiciousness

Bizarre

N/A
N/A

Grandiose
1

N/A
Suspiciousness

Nonbizarre

2

Erotomanic
3

4

Mixed/Other
5

Bizarre

N/A

6

7

Nonbizarre

Persecutory

Jealous

Mixed/Other

10. Unusual thought content

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

11. Hallucinations

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

12. Bizarre behavior

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

13. Self-neglect

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

14. Disorientation

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

15. Conceptual disorganization

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

16. Blunted affect

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

17. Emotional withdrawal

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

18. Motor retardation

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

19. Tension

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

20. Uncooperativeness

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

21. Excitement

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

22. Distractibility

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

23. Motor hyperactivity

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

24. Mannerisms and posturing

N/A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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11. Reason for initial CST evaluation:
1=disruptive, bizarre behavior
2= indicators of MI while in custody and/or documented history of MI
3=suicidal behavior or history of such behavior
4=uncooperative with counsel
5=bizarreness of offense
6=appears unkempt
7=not specified (N/S)
12. Competency related ability impaired: (impaired)
0=Capacity to participate in trial: (Yes/No)
1= Capacity to testify relevantly: (Yes/No)
2=Capacity to understand the adversary nature of proceedings: (Yes/No)
3=Capacity to disclose relevant information to counsel: (Yes/No)
4=Basic knowledge of legal strategies and options: (Yes/No)
5=Relationship with counsel: (Yes/No)
6=Capacity for reasoned choice among options: (Yes/No)
7=Capacity to behave appropriately in court: (Yes/No)
8= Capacity to appreciate charges: (Yes/No)
9= Capacity to appreciate potential penalties: (Yes/No)
10=Medication effects on CST: (Yes/No)
11=Other (specify): _________________________________________________
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13. Previous psychiatric hospitalizations and/or treatment: (Yes/No)
_______________
14. Comorbid psychiatric disorders (after 120 days/first study):
0=None
1=Cognitive disorder
2=Substance use disorder: [specify type(s)] ______________________________
3=Personality Disorder: (specify by name) ______________________________
4=Other disorder:(specify by name): ______________________________
15. Delusional subtype:
1=persecutory
2=jealous
3=grandiose
4=erotomanic
5=somatic
6=mixed
16. Dimensional rating of delusions:
16.1

Action:
0=unrelated to index offense
1=non-aggressive actions
2=aggressive acts without injury to the victims
3=aggressive acts with injury or use of weapon(s).

16.2

Pervasiveness:
0=not at all

1=some

2=numerous

3=virtually all
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17. Hallucinations: (yes/no) ________
18. Type (e.g., auditory, tactile): _______________________
19. Antipsychotic medication(s): (yes/no) ______
19.1 Trial 1 - Specify name: __________________________________________
If discontinued specify if: N/C_____ Refusal_____ Side-effects_____
19.2 Trial 2 - Specify name: __________________________________________
If discontinued specify if: N/C_____ Refusal_____ Side-effects_____
19.3 Trial 3 - Specify name: __________________________________________
If discontinued specify if: N/C_____ Refusal_____ Side-effects_____
19.4 More than 3 - Specify name(s): ____________________________________
20. Other psychiatric medication(s): (specify name) ___________________________
21. No. of psychotropic medication trials to restoration: ________________________
22. Participation in any non-pharmacological intervention: (yes/no) ______
Specify type if available: __________________
23. Treatment refusal: (yes/no) ________
24. Sell authority requested: Yes

No (Granted/Not Granted) ________________

24.1 If not granted, list reason: ________________________________________
25. Was subject/defendant transferred from FMC after 1st study?

Yes

No

26. Date of CST opinion after first study:__________________________________
27. CST opinion:

0=IST (not restored)

1=CST (restored)
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Appendix B
§ 4241. Determination of Mental Competency to Stand Trial to undergo Postrelease
Proceedings
(a) Motion To Determine Competency of Defendant.—At any time after the
commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to the sentencing of the
defendant, or at any time after the commencement of probation or supervised release and
prior to the completion of the sentence, the defendant or the attorney for the Government
may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant.
The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there
is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a
mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is
unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to
assist properly in his defense.
(b) Psychiatric or Psychological Examination and Report.—Prior to the date of
the hearing, the court may order that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the
defendant be conducted, and that a psychiatric or psychological report be filed with the
court, pursuant to the provisions of section 4247(b) and (c).
(c) Hearing.—the hearing shall be conducted pursuant to the provisions of section
4247(d).
(d) Determination and Disposition.—If, after the hearing, the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental
disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to
understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist
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properly in his defense, the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the
Attorney General. The Attorney General shall hospitalize the defendant for treatment in a
suitable facility—
(1) for such a reasonable period of time, not to exceed four months, as is
necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that in the
foreseeable future he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to
go forward; and
(2) for an additional reasonable period of time until—
(A) his mental condition is so improved that trial may proceed, if
the court finds that there is a substantial probability that within
such additional period of time he will attain the capacity to permit
the proceedings to go forward; or
(B) the pending charges against him are disposed of according to
law;
whichever is earlier.
If, at the end of the time period specified, it is determined that the defendant's mental
condition has not so improved as to permit the proceedings to go forward, the defendant
is subject to the provisions of sections 4246 and 4248.
(e) Discharge.—When the director of the facility in which a defendant is
hospitalized pursuant to subsection (d) determines that the defendant has recovered to
such an extent that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him and to assist properly in his defense, he shall promptly file a
certificate to that effect with the clerk of the court that ordered the commitment. The
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clerk shall send a copy of the certificate to the defendant's counsel and to the attorney for
the Government. The court shall hold a hearing, conducted pursuant to the provisions of
section 4247(d), to determine the competency of the defendant. If, after the hearing, the
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has recovered to such
an extent that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him and to assist properly in his defense, the court shall order his immediate
discharge from the facility in which he is hospitalized and shall set the date for trial or
other proceedings. Upon discharge, the defendant is subject to the provisions of chapters
207 and 227.
(f) Admissibility of Finding of Competency.—A finding by the court that the
defendant is mentally competent to stand trial shall not prejudice the defendant in raising
the issue of his insanity as a defense to the offense charged, and shall not be admissible as
evidence in a trial for the offense charged.
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